Violent Crime Reduction Bill - Standing Committee B

[Mr. Eric Forth in the Chair]

Violent Crime Reduction Bill

Clause 13 - Designation of alcohol disorder zones

Amendment proposed [this day]: No. 174, in clause 13, page 11, line 37, after ‘satisfied’, insert ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.—[Mr. Malins.]

Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.

Eric Forth: I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following amendments:
No. 138, in clause 13, page 11, line 38, after ‘been’, insert ‘persistent and repeated’.
No. 139, in clause 13, page 11, line 39, leave out ‘or disorder’.
No. 44, in clause 13, page 11, line 40, leave out from ‘with’ to ‘the’ in line 41.
No. 162, in clause 13, page 11, line 45, at end insert
‘; and
(e)the decision to designate that locality as an alcohol disorder zone is reasonable in all the circumstances’.

Jeremy Wright: I was talking about amendment No. 162 and the concept of reasonableness that it would bring to clause 13(1). I invite the Minister to consider the fact that the test set out in the Bill is subjective. The local authority should be satisfied not only of the necessity for an alcohol disorder zone but that imposing such a zone is the most appropriate response. Because of the financial obligations that the clause will impose not only on the businesses who may be at fault but on some that are not at fault, it seems sensible for that additional fetter to placed on the discretion of local authorities.
The Minister said that the alcohol disorder zone was an order of last resort, and I understand that it should not be used unless it is the only way to deal with the problem. It therefore seems sensible to have such a safeguard. I accept that the opinion of the chief police officer of the locality will have to be taken into account, but even with that additional constraint it seems sensible to consider putting an additional fetter on the discretion of local authorities, to ensure that alcohol disorder zone proposals are reasonable in every respect, so that they have the support of the business community.

Hazel Blears: Clause 13(1) sets out the criteria for the designation of alcohol disorder zones. In  summary, the criteria provide a three-part test before an zone can be designated—a general test of the nuisance, annoyance and disorder, a link to the consumption of alcohol, and the likelihood of repetition. Amendment No. 162, tabled by the hon. Member for Rugby and Kenilworth (Jeremy Wright), focuses generally on the first test, establishing the link to the consumption of alcohol and the level of proof required.
The hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Malins) asked some probing questions about whether the standard of proof was equivalent to that in civil or criminal cases—but such a standard of proof is not appropriate for a local authority decisions. Well-established case law and guidance is available on how local authorities should reach such decisions. It would not be appropriate to have a civil or a criminal standard of proof in such circumstances.
The Bill provides an overall framework. Clause 16 provides for guidance to be issued. Local authorities will have a duty to follow that guidance, which brings into play the point made by the hon. Member for Rugby and Kenilworth. Designating a zone is to be a last resort. The guidance will also provide for alternative interventions, and specific premises can be tackled under the Licensing Act 2003 or other powers. That should be sufficient.
On that basis, we do not need the reference to “persistent and repeated” alcohol misuse, as suggested by the Liberal Democrats’ amendment No. 138. We have a range of powers, and there will be guidance and alternative interventions.
Amendment No. 139 would delete the reference to disorder, but we have been over that territory before. We want the zones to cover crime and disorder; it would weaken them significantly if we were to remove the link to disorder and antisocial behaviour, limiting the criterion to criminal activity. The hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green (Lynne Featherstone) should consider the fact that many of our constituents suffer from disorder as well as from criminal activity, particularly with binge drinking, when disorder becomes completely unacceptable.
Amendment No. 162, tabled by the hon. Member for Rugby and Kenilworth, would add a reasonableness test. I understand where he is coming from, but the Bill contains a series of checks and balances, including the joint trigger between the police and the local authority, the need for an action plan, and the fact that an ADZ is to be used at a last resort. At the end of the day, all local authority decisions have to be reasonable, as they can be subject to judicial review. Their decisions would have to meet the Wednesbury test on rationality. They must take account of all relevant considerations, not take account of irrelevant considerations, and be reasonable in all the circumstances. If a completely irrational local authority decided to impose an alcohol disorder zone where there was no problem, there would be the possibility of making a judicial review challenge. I appreciate the point that the hon. Gentleman is trying to make, but there are already sufficient checks and balances in the system.

Humfrey Malins: I may have missed this, in which case I am sorry, but has the Minister commented on amendment No. 44, which relates to whether an alcohol disorder zone can cover an area in which none of the alcohol responsible for the problem has been purchased?

Hazel Blears: My apologies for not dealing with that amendment. It relates to clause 13(1)(b), which is designed to ensure that an alcohol disorder zone can cover the consumption of alcohol in the public realm, as well as in particular premises. It therefore relates to people drinking on the street.
Clearly, the local authority must act reasonably, and I cannot envisage the situation that hon. Members have suggested, in which an alcohol disorder zone would be introduced simply because that people were coming into an area and consuming alcohol. There would have to be a problem with members of the public being caused nuisance and annoyance as a result of the consumption of alcohol, as well as the likelihood that that behaviour would be repeated, and the local authority’s decision would have to be reasonable.
One problem might be people buying alcohol elsewhere—as we have discussed, there could be off-licences outside an area—and then coming to that area, drinking on the streets and causing problems. However, I find it difficult to envisage that that would be the only problem and that it could be used to justify introducing an alcohol disorder zone. There would be a range of associated problems, with people drinking on and off the premises of pubs and clubs.
Subsection (1) is not designed to allow us to introduce an alcohol disorder zone simply because people are coming from another place. However, it does allow us to consider how to deal with people who are drinking not only inside pubs and clubs, but on the streets outside. It is therefore a sensible provision.

Humfrey Malins: I thank the Minister for her full reply, and beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 175, in clause 13, page 12, line 1, after ‘locality’, insert
‘, including the proposed content of the action plan’.

Eric Forth: With this we may discuss the following amendments: No. 163, in clause 13, page 12, line 12, at end insert
‘and which are reasonable in all the circumstances’.
No. 164, in clause 13, page 12, line 13, after ‘appropriate’, insert ‘and which is reasonable’.
No. 165, in clause 13, page 12, line 14, leave out
‘bringing it to the attention of’
and insert ‘communicating it to’.
No. 140, in clause 13, page 12, line 20, at end insert—
‘(4A)The relevant authorities shall consult with affected business within the locality on the draft action plan.’.
No. 176, in clause 13, page 12, line 20, at end insert—
‘(d)consider and respond to any representations made in accordance with subsection (3)’.
No. 141, in clause 13, page 12, line 40, leave out paragraph (b).
No. 166, in clause 13, page 12, line 43, at end insert
‘and provided that decision to make such an order is reasonable in all the circumstances’.

Humfrey Malins: The clause covers what a local authority needs to do to designate a locality as an alcohol disorder zone. My first passing thought is that a great deal of bureaucracy is involved, that there will be a lot of extra burdens on local authorities and that time will be taken. Is there any way of shortening the process?
[Mr. James Clappison in the Chair]
Subsection (2) requires a local authority to
“publish a notice—
(a)setting out their proposal to designate the locality; and
(b)inviting persons ... to make representations”.

Lynne Featherstone: Amendments Nos. 140 and 141 deal to some extent with the point made by the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Malins). The Government seem to want representations from businesses and establishments in the zone in order to set up the plan once the local authority and the local police authority have accepted it. Those businesses and establishments have no opportunity to criticise or comment, or to point out particular hardship or special circumstances in connection with the completed plan. This appears to be a fait accompli. The Government have put on record the fact that they want to enable people to bring about the improvements themselves, but one stage of the process appears to have been omitted. It devalues the proposals, and the intention, if those affected by the scheme cannot comment on that element of consultation and partnership in the improvement stage.

Stephen McCabe: I understand what the hon. Lady is saying, and I hear some of her views. I wonder, however, if there is a risk of the amendment making the process unnecessarily bureaucratic. Although the clause refers to representations, one hopes that it really means that there will proper negotiation. If it means that there must a formal process in which things are sent out, come back and are written down and advertised, it will create an expensive and bureaucratic process. What I want, and what I believe the hon. Lady wants, is to know that there is meaningful negotiation leading to a realistic action plan.

Lynne Featherstone: I thank the hon. Gentleman. I believe that we are thinking along the same lines. Perhaps it is my inexperience with legislation, but I am simply concerned that the Bill does not make that explicit. Perhaps the Minister can make it so; I would welcome her clarification.
On amendment No. 141, if there is a genuine opportunity in a given period to see whether an action plan is working, it will either be given a chance or it will not. It negates the point of the mechanism for allowing local pubs eight weeks to show the local authority and the local police authority that they can behave and improve themselves if the local authority can step in early and say that it does not believe that they will do so. I am simply concerned that this is another “Go straight to jail and don’t pass Go” clause.

Jeremy Wright: I shall not speak at length to amendments Nos. 163, 164 and 166, or to No. 165 on a separate subject, but shall say simply that I am grateful for what the Minister said about the reasonableness clause, which I proposed in an earlier group of amendments. Amendments Nos. 163, 164 and 166 make the same point about the action plan and about the variation, at a later point, of alcohol disorder zones.
I understand what the Minister said about judicial review, although as she knows, it is a lengthy and expensive process to challenge a local authority’s decision in that way. Will she, at the appropriate stage, consider regulations so that we can find ways in which local authority decisions can be challenged more swiftly and less expensively? I shall leave that thought there.
Amendment No. 165 is a probing amendment designed to make a simple point, which I accept might be dealt with a little later in the clause. The clause states that the local authority should bring the action plan
“to the attention of persons likely to be interested in it”.
I wonder whether it would be more sensible to make that duty more active, so that the local authority must communicate it to persons likely to be interested in it rather than simply bring it to their attention. It should be made very clear, particularly as such an action plan has financial consequences, given subsection (5). The amendment has more resonance in the context of clause 14, but it is designed to ask the Minister whether she believes that the wording of the clause is adequate to deal with the problem that I mentioned.
[Mr. Eric Forth in the Chair] 1.15 pm

Hazel Blears: Amendment No. 175 would require the local authority to publish the content of the proposed action plan when publishing the proposal to designate an ADZ. The hon. Member for Woking makes a good point. We know from our consultation with stakeholders that it is important for people to see the proposed action plan at the consultation stage, when they make their representations. I also think it important that people can see not only the action plan but the actions that might be taken if the compulsory  charging stage were reached. They could then keep in mind the consequences of not implementing the action plan.
I do not think that the amendment is the right way to secure that result. However, I assure hon. Members that, through a combination of regulations and guidance, what we mean by the proposal to designate an alcohol disorder zone will be spelled out. That will include a requirement to publish the proposed content of the action plan at the consultation stage, so that people will have a fair chance of knowing what the steps will be. I think that that would be a proper way of proceeding, and better than specifying everything in the Bill.
As for amendments Nos. 163, 164 and 166, which were tabled by the hon. Member for Rugby and Kenilworth, I think that I dealt with the point about reasonableness. Local authorities are conscious of the need to act intra vires. In my experience local authorities do not behave as mavericks. They know what the consequences of judicial review are; it is not pleasant and it costs a lot of money. I am sure that they will exercise their policies in a reasonable way. Again, we can ensure that by means of regulation and guidance.
With regard to amendment No. 165, another of those tabled by the hon. Member for Rugby and Kenilworth, I am not sure that there is any difference between bringing something to someone’s attention and communicating with them. If there is, it is semantic. I agree that there is a need for meaningful and constructive engagement between the trade and the local authority. Perhaps if the hon. Gentleman had drafted the Bill he would have used the term “communicate”, but I do not think that an amendment is necessary.
Amendment No. 140 contains a specific requirement for affected businesses to be consulted on the action plan. I agree that they need to be involved, and when we publish the proposal people will know the action plan requirements and the charges. My concern about the amendment is that it could mean that an additional formal round of consultation was required. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hall Green (Steve McCabe) made the point that that could lead to extra bureaucracy and lengthy delay—and the hon. Member for Woking was concerned to avoid delay in the making of the orders.
Amendment No. 176 concerns a requirement to respond to representations received during the 28-day consultation period. I do not think that that requirement is needed in the Bill. The real prize is an effective action zone, not a series of negotiations about what should be in the action plan. We need the action plan, not necessarily the charge. As I have said, I do not want the charging stage to be reached.
Regulations and guidance can cover all the issues that hon. Members have raised. That is what happens in relation to designated public places orders concerning drinking in the street, and that process works well enough.
Amendment No. 141 is perhaps more serious. It would remove the second limb of clause 13(8), which states that the local authority can take action before or after the expiry of the eight-week period. If an action plan has been made and it is clear that the relevant people are not coming to meetings, are not willing to engage and will take no action, I do not think that the local authority should have to sit on its hands and take no action for two months, while problems continue on the street.
Equally, if an action plan existed and in the ninth week everyone concerned stopped doing what they were supposed to do, the amendment would make it necessary to go back to the beginning of a new process. That is not appropriate either. We want the zones to bite and to be effective. I therefore ask hon. Members not to press their amendments.

Humfrey Malins: May I correct an oversight, Mr. Forth, and thank my hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Mr. Clappison) who, in your brief absence a moment ago, took over the Chair with such charm, courtesy and efficiency—matched only by that of the Minister, who has responded very helpfully to the debate? I am happy with her response to my amendment, although we might return to some of the issues on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

James Clappison: I beg to move amendment No. 45, in clause 13, page 12, line 43, at end insert—
‘(9)The following persons may appeal to the Crown Court against the designation of a locality as an alcohol disorder zone—
(a)a person holding a premises licence authorising the use of premises in the locality for the sale of alcohol by retail, or
(b)a nominated officer of a club in the locality, holding a club premises certificate authorising the supply of alcohol to members or guests.
(10)Any appeal made under subsection (9) above shall be made within 28 days of the designation.’.

Eric Forth: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: New clause 11—Appeals against designation of zones—
‘(1)Any—
(a)person who holds a premises licence authorising the use of the premises in an alcohol disorder zone for the sale of alcohol by retail, or
(b)club which is authorised by virtue of a club premises certificate to use premises in such zones for the supply of alcohol to members or guests,
may appeal to the Tribunal.
(2)On an appeal under this section, the Tribunal may—
(a)dismiss the appeal, or
(b)exclude an area, which includes the premises of the appellant, from the relevant alcohol disorder zone, or
(c)revoke the designation of an area designated as an alcohol disorder zone.
(3)No area which has ceased to be, or to be part of, an alcohol disorder zone pursuant to subsection (2)(a) or (2)(b) may be re-designated as an alcohol disorder zone within two years of it ceasing to be so designated without the consent of the President of the Tribunal.’.
New clause 12—Constitution of Tribunal—
‘(1)In sections [Appeals against designation of zones] [Tribunal Procedure], “the Tribunal” means the Alcohol Disorder Zone (Designation) Tribunal.
(2)The Tribunal shall exercise the jurisdiction conferred on it by this Chapter.
(3)There shall be appointed—
(a)a President of the Tribunal (referred to in this Chapter as “the President”),
(b)a panel of persons (referred to in this Chapter as “the chairmen’s panel”) who may serve as chairman of the Tribunal, and
(c)a panel of persons (referred to in this Chapter as “the lay panel”) who may serve as the other two members of the Tribunal apart from the chairman.
(4)The President and the members of the chairmen’s panel shall each be appointed by the Lord Chancellor.
(5)The members of the lay panel shall each be appointed by the Secretary of State.
(6)The Secretary of State may by regulations—
(a)provide for the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to be exercised by such number of tribunals as may be determined from time to time by the President, and
(b)make such other provision in connection with the establishment and continuation of the Tribunal as the Secretary of State considers necessary or desirable.
(7)The Secretary of State may, with the consent of the Treasury, provide such staff and accommodation as the Tribunal may require.’.
New clause 13—President and members of the panels—
‘(1)No person may be appointed President or member of the chairmen’s panel unless he has a seven year general qualification (within the meaning of section 71 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990).
(2)The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about the requirements to be satisfied by a person before he may be appointed a member of the lay panel.
(3)If, in the opinion of the Lord Chancellor and of the Lord Chief Justice, the President is unfit to continue in office or is incapable of performing his duties, the Lord Chancellor may, with the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice, revoke his appointment.
(4)Each member of the chairmen’s panel or lay panel shall hold and vacate office under the terms of the instrument under which he is appointed.
(5)The President or a member of the chairmen’s panel or lay panel—
(a)may resign office by notice in writing to the Lord Chancellor or (as the case may be) the Secretary of State, and
(b)is eligible for re-appointment if he ceases to hold office.’.
New clause 14—Remuneration and expenses—
‘(1)The Secretary of State may pay to the President, and to any other person in respect of his service as a member of the Tribunal, such remuneration and allowances as the Secretary of State may, with the consent of the Treasury, determine.
(2)The Secretary of State may defray the expenses of the Tribunal to such amount as he may, with the consent of the Treasury, determine.’.
New clause 15—Tribunal procedure—
‘(1)The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about the proceedings of the Tribunal on an appeal under this Chapter and the initiation of such an appeal.
(2)The regulations may, in particular, include provision—
(a)as to the period within which, and the manner in which, appeals are to be instituted,
(b)where the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is being exercised by more than one tribunal—
(i)for determining by which tribunal any appeal is to be heard, and
(ii)for the transfer of proceedings from one tribunal to another,
(c)for enabling any functions which relate to matters preliminary or incidental to an appeal to be performed by the President, or by the chairman,
(d)for hearings to be conducted in the absence of any member other than the chairman,
(e)as to the persons who may appear on behalf of the parties,
(f)for granting any person such disclosure or inspection of documents or right to further particulars as might be granted by a county court,
(g)requiring persons to attend to give evidence and produce documents,
(h)for authorising the administration of oaths to witnesses,
(i)for the determination of appeals without a hearing in prescribed circumstances,
(j)as to the withdrawal of appeals,
(k)for the award of costs or expenses,
(l)for taxing or otherwise settling any such costs or expenses (and, in particular, for enabling such costs to be taxed in the county court),
(m)for the registration and proof of decisions and orders, and
(n)for enabling the Tribunal to review its decisions, or revoke or vary its orders, in such circumstances as may be determined in accordance with the regulations.
(3)The Secretary of State may pay such allowances for the purpose of or in connection with the attendance of persons at the Tribunal as he may, with the consent of the Treasury, determine.
(4)Part I of the Arbitration Act 1996 shall not apply to any proceedings before the Tribunal but regulations may make provision corresponding to any provision of that Part.
(5)Any person who without reasonable excuse fails to comply with—
(a)any requirement in respect of the discovery or inspection of documents imposed by the regulations by virtue of subsection (2)(f), or
(b)any requirement imposed by the regulations by virtue of subsection (2)(g),
is guilty of an offence.
(6)A person guilty of an offence under subsection (5) is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale.’.
New clause 16—Alcohol Disorder Zone (Designation) Tribunal for Wales—
‘(1)There shall be a tribunal to be known as the Alcohol Disorder Zone (Designation) Tribunal for Wales.
(2)Sections Appeals against designation of zones to Tribunal President shall apply in relation to that tribunal as they apply in relation to the Alcohol Disorder Zone (Designation) Tribunal, but as if—
(a)functions of the Secretary of State were functions of the National Assembly for Wales,
(b)references to the Secretary of State were references to the National Assembly for Wales,
(c)requirements for the Treasury’s consent were omitted.
(3)The powers of the National Assembly for Wales under sections 16B(4) and (5) and 16C(2) are exercisable only with the agreement of the Secretary of State.’.

James Clappison: We now come to appeals. The Minister has spoken at some length about consultation and the representations that will be made while the local authority carries out its deliberations and before it reaches its decision. We thought that it would be appropriate to table an amendment to explore what happens after it has reached that decision. What are the possibilities for appeal? We would like to hear the Minister’s comments, because the issue will clearly affect businesses very seriously and it needs to be explored.
The amendment is framed in the normal terms for such an amendment and raises the possibility of an appeal to the Crown court. As you will no doubt know,  Mr. Forth, such appeals are common in these matters, and the Crown court would seem to be the appropriate place to make an appeal. However, we look forward to hearing from the Minister what the possibilities for appeal are.

Hazel Blears: I welcome the hon. Member for Hertsmere to his place on the Front Bench. Charm and efficiency appear to be the order of the day.
The provisions would create a right of appeal against the designation of an area as an alcohol disorder zone. Amendment No. 45 would make an appeal exercisable through the Crown Court, while the new clauses discuss the introduction of a bespoke alcohol disorder zone appeals tribunal—but we might get into a bit of heavy weather with that.
I shall resist the amendments because we have tried to design the alcohol disorder zone process to be flexible and as speedy as possible, to tackle the very real problems that we face. As I said to the hon. Member for Rugby and Kenilworth, we have tried to build in a series of checks and balances to ensure fairness between the parties, without making the process too bureaucratic. Those checks and balances include a joint police-local authority trigger, so there must be consultation between the police and the local authority, and a recognition that there is a real problem. There will be a formal consultation process lasting 28 days, so that people will know what proposals, including charging proposals, are in the action plan.
There will also be an eight-week period to allow for commencement of the action plan, and if people show willing during that period and take action to solve the problems, there will be no need to move to designation. There will then be a formal three-monthly review of designation, and I hope that hon. Members feel that that is a fairly short period—we are not asking people to pay charges for months or years without a formal review. If people come together to take action to solve the problem of drunken behaviour and disorder, we intend to be able to lift the designation so that they no longer have to pay the charges. I genuinely believe that that series of checks and balances is sufficient for those involved not to have to go through a lengthy appeals process. Appeals to the Crown court could take an inordinate time.
Clause 12(9) makes provision—we intend to cover this in regulations—for appeals relating to the payment, collection and enforcement of the charge, in accordance with general local authority provisions. Where charges are made, people will be entitled to challenge those charges and to make an appeal. Although there will be no appeal against the designation, therefore, there will be measures to challenge the charging provisions. That series of checks and balances should give people sufficient reassurance that we intend the policy to operate fairly, and I ask the hon. Member for Hertsmere to withdraw the amendment.

James Clappison: I am grateful to the Minister for her response, which was useful. She has elucidated the Government’s thinking, taking us through the various  stages of the process. She has also explored the question of appeal rights. We thought it appropriate for the Committee to explore that issue and we have done that a little this afternoon. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

James Clappison: I cannot let the clause pass without a little more detail from the Minister on the Government’s thinking about the contents of the action plan under subsection (6). We heard a little in earlier debates on the question of consultation, but nothing about what the contents of the plan would be. We need to hear something about that from the Minister.
Besides the requirements for businesses, the action plan also has requirements for the local authorities and police force. Clearly, they have an important role to play. I had the pleasure of serving on the Home Affairs Committee when it conducted an inquiry into this and I was struck when the Committee was told in evidence about the sheer volume of people on our streets, in particular late on Friday and Saturday nights, most of them young people under 25.
The Committee was told by the chief constable of Nottinghamshire, for example, that in the run-up to Christmas last year on a Friday or Saturday night in December there could be up to 100,000 people on the streets. The sheer volume of people in an area of night-time entertainment must be addressed. I want to hear some of the Minister’s thinking about that. She knows of the issues raised in the Home Affairs Committee about the need for good transport facilities to get people easily away from town centres when they want to leave, and the need for such basic things as toilet facilities in city centres. She will also be aware of the Committee’s recommendations about the need to incorporate the idea of large numbers of people into the planning process so that town centres can be properly planned to cope with such numbers.
In a lot of such cases it is the volume of people contained in a particular area that is part of the problem. We need to hear from the Minister the detail of what the Government are expecting local authorities and police officers to do about that.

Stephen McCabe: I agree with the Minister that we want a short process that addresses the problem rather than an extended, judicial, bureaucratic process. My fear, and that of some of my constituents—many other members of the Committee have alluded to the same fear—is about what happens when the local authority does not pay due attention to its own responsibilities for the problem, whether that is to do with the provision of public toilets, the nature of the bus service or the location of taxi facilities.
The guidance that is issued must offer some capacity, without making it an extended process, for other bodies to comment on local authorities’ responsibility. Otherwise the local authority, as one of the ring holders, could largely dictate and shape a plan  that gives responsibility to everyone else and evades problems that are either their responsibility or partly of their own making.
I do not want a long-drawn-out process, but it seems to me that it would be possible to make it clear in guidance that the local authority, when considering an action plan, has to be honest and forthright about its responsibilities. There must be some mechanism through which people can draw to its attention feelings that they think are part of the problem.

Stewart Hosie: Can the Minister cast a little more light on the designation of alcohol disorder zones, which was touched on briefly in amendment No. 44. There is some concern about the ability to designate an alcohol disorder zone in an area where alcohol is consumed unrelated to where it is purchased. I know that we have been through the arguments a number of times, but I am not sure whether there is clarity on one particular point. Many of us have had representations from the supermarket, bingo club or whatever. One such example was brought to my attention two weeks ago by a bingo operator that operates in the vicinity of a municipal car park, but has no authority over the car park and no responsibility for it. Youths frequently buy alcohol elsewhere, go to the car park and cause disorder. When the police are called, as they frequently are, they take note that the location is outside that particular bingo hall. I know that that is already a problem, because the operators have had robust discussions with the local authority licensing committee because although the trouble is nothing to do with them, the police reports show a large number of incidents in the vicinity of their bingo hall.
The question that I hope the Minister can answer is: what consideration has been given to the possibility of that bingo operator, or any other operator, taking legal recourse for compensation for the loss of revenue if its licence is suspended, revoked, or amended in some way in cognisance of the disorder in an area for which it is not responsible and over which it has no authority? What consideration has been given to compensation being sought by suppliers, not least the Scottish whisky industry, whose revenues might also go down as a result of licences being revoked, suspended or amended within licensed premises near trouble in areas for which they are not responsible and over which they have no authority? It is a serious point about which many hon. Members have received representations.

Jim Sheridan: It is an honour to follow the hon. Gentleman, because I am trying to tease out his party’s thinking. There has been a great deal of discussion about alcohol orders and the role played by local businesses, such as supermarkets, so I took the liberty during the lunch break of finding out the views of other parties.
I have made reference to the Scottish Parliament, and although we do not have a lot of influence over what it does, I am assured by the Minister that, in drafting the Bill this Parliament consulted extensively  with the Scottish Parliament. It concerns me that, in connection with the Scottish Parliament’s Licensing (Scotland) Bill, MSP Bruce Crawford is quoted by the Press Association as having said that the move was needed to tackle the growing problems of alcohol misuse and antisocial behaviour surrounding off-licences and other shops selling alcohol, and that
“All the statistics available make it clear that alcohol misuse is on the rise not just among the adult population but even more alarmingly among young people and children. Given this depressing background now is not the time to be giving off-sales licensed premises and supermarkets the opportunity to sell alcohol for 24 hours per day.”
The question has then to be asked: if it is not just the SNP that supports that position, but also the Liberals and Conservatives in the Scottish Parliament, is it just Scottish supermarkets that are irresponsible when it comes to selling alcohol?

Hazel Blears: I am more than happy to go into a little detail about the kind of things that might be in the action plan if that would assist the Committee. I circulated annex B with my letter last week. That set out the kind of things that could be in an action plan, such as additional high-visibility policing, and the application of the industry principles and standards document—that is the code of practice that I have mentioned before, which covers “no ID no sale”, irresponsible promotions and a dispersal policy.
I was interested to hear from some nightclub operators that if, at the end of the evening, they play certain kinds of music and put the lights up gradually, they find that people who have been in an absolute frenzy half an hour previously gently chill out and calm down. [Interruption.] It is true. If one plays gentle music and gradually turns the lights up, people who would otherwise be completely frenzied when they come out on to the streets are calmer and more chilled out, and do not get into fights over the girls they are not going home with—a cause of much fighting. Some responsible night club operators try through their lighting and music to ensure that people do not get in such a state.
Another interesting thing that I have seen in Manchester, which has a good programme, is coffee bars being open at 3, 4 or 5 o’clock in the morning. People waiting for their parents to collect them or waiting for an all-night bus can have a cup of coffee and perhaps sober up a little before dad arrives; they are in a better state to be taken home. That, too, is an enormous help.
Toughened drinking glasses will help solve the problem of people cutting each other’s faces with broken glasses. We also have licensing enforcement. The pubwatch scheme is linked to radio pagers so that pubs can alert each other if trouble is brewing; and people can be excluded. CCTV is being installed. Taxi marshals, whom I have seen at work in Manchester and Cardiff, marshal the queues. Another big flash-point for violence can be people trying to jump the taxi queue at 2 am, so having fairly large, burly and sober people can make a big difference.
Additional street cleaning services are often necessary. Manchester has been employing bus loaders—large people in uniform who see people onto the all-night buses. For the first time, the all-night buses in Manchester are profitable, because youngsters now want to use them. That is a win for everyone. The council does not have to pay extra; the service is funded by the bus companies.
We want to ensure that the things that are charged for are to some extent linked to what people get. There will be extra enforcement work, with frequent visits to premises, and trading standards will run test purchasing operations with under-age youngsters being sent in. Environmental health visits can help deal with excessive noise, which is another big problem. CCTV can be installed outside licensed premises, and cleaning the streets directly outside licensed premises in the zone, perhaps where people have had unfortunate incidents and left appalling messes on the pavements, could also be charged for.
All that can be done through voluntary arrangements. We want to encourage people to enter into business improvement districts, as they have done in Birmingham and other places. Arrangements that make town centres more attractive places to be can be arranged voluntarily. I would much rather have that than see such places end up as part of an alcohol disorder zone.

Mark Prisk: The Minister mentioned a number of roles. Given my stature, I would have a greater chance of becoming a bus loader than the Minister. Her list describes what I would call administrative actions that could help make things nicer after the problem has arisen. Which of the activities in that list will reduce the amount that people drink?

Hazel Blears: Additional high-visibility policing and the use of fixed penalty notices early in the evening are two. Lancashire has been using fixed penalty notices. During its alcohol campaign, the police tactic was to go out in the early evening when they saw that people were starting to get drunk, and issue fixed penalty notices. It worked so well that serious violence fell by 7 per cent. Low level violence increased, but because they were catching more people the number of more serious assaults decreased. They were nipping the problem in the bud; people were not getting to the point when they were so drunk that they indulged in horrendous violence.
Environmental health visits to premises, with subsequent prosecution, and the increased fines available under the Licensing Act 2003 ought to start changing behaviour, with licensees not selling to under-age youngsters.
Taxi marshalling is coping with the problem rather than preventing it, but enforcement can lead to prevention. If enforcement is good, people will think twice about doing the same thing on the next Friday night. Getting a fixed penalty notice of £80 each time ought to be a disincentive for such behaviour.
I can tell my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hall Green that local authorities should not be able simply to pass the burden on to everyone else. Clause 13(6) states that
“The action plan must also contain proposals by ... the local authority”
and
“the local chief officer of police, about what action they will take in relation to that locality if the plan is implemented.”
There is a clear line of responsibility, but I entirely take the point that for the plan to be effective it must be about working in partnership.
The hon. Member for Dundee, East (Stewart Hosie) raised the issue of compensation. It is unlikely that any compensation claims should succeed, and there will be no general right to compensation. There could be similar issues with drinking in public places orders: if we say that people may not drink in public in certain parts of town, people whose products are not consumed as often as they were could have a theoretical general right to compensation, but that has not happened and I do not envisage it happening.

Stewart Hosie: My point is specifically about a company, business or club that is in a designated zone because of trouble in an area that they clearly have no responsibility for or authority over. The non-drinking zones in Dundee city centre, which are byelaws, work perfectly reasonably in the whole of the city centre because they are for the common good. Is the Minister certain that claims for compensation could not arise in the specific circumstances I describe?

Hazel Blears: That is the advice that I have received. There is to be collective responsibility; we have gone over that ground several times. The advice is apparently from counsel, so we are fairly satisfied on that point.
My hon. Friend the Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire, North (Jim Sheridan) raised some important points. We are faced with the problems across the UK, so it is important that we deal with them.
I hope that I have reassured hon. Members with my remarks about what could be in the action plan. It was useful to have the opportunity to set that out.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 13 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 14 - Procedure for designation of zones

Lynne Featherstone: I beg to move amendment No. 142, in clause 14, page 13, line 3, leave out subsection (3).

Eric Forth: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 167, in clause 14, page 13, line 4, after ‘varied’, insert
‘and to do so would be reasonable in accordance with the provisions of subsection 13(1)’.
No. 144, in clause 14, page 13, line 20, at end insert—
‘(5A)Twelve months after the compulsory charging stage of an Alcohol Disorder Zone has been implemented, the locality will cease to be designated as an Alcohol Disorder Zone.
(5B)If the local authority and police authority agree that the designation of the locality as an Alcohol Disorder Zone should continue, they may repeat the procedure set out under section 13 for the designation of the locality as an alcohol disorder zone.’.
No. 143, in clause 14, page 13, line 21, leave out subsection (6).
No. 168, in clause 14, page 13, line 26, leave out ‘publicise’ and insert ‘communicate’.

Lynne Featherstone: With amendment No. 142, we propose to remove subsection (3) of the clause, which allows a local authority to vary or extend an alcohol disorder zone. The measure means that premises might find themselves in a zone for which they have had no opportunity to join in the improvement or form part of the action plan, which they would have had if they had been in the original zone. It goes against the principles of natural justice that a zone might be extended to include an establishment that does not then have rights to make proposals for reformation and on how to improve its character and behaviour. Theoretically, a local authority could extend a zone to the edge of town. There are no limitations on that. It seems patently unfair that establishments included in that way should not have the same rights as those in the original zone.
Amendment No. 144 is a probing amendment to find out how the Government intend to ensure that areas are not condemned to being alcohol disorder zones for the rest of their natural lives, albeit that a review is mentioned and the Minister has gone some way towards explaining what the content might be. The amendment would effectively introduce a sunset clause. If ADZs are a last resort to combat alcohol-related nuisance, they should have a set life span, otherwise a local authority that is troubled with such disorder might have little incentive to lift the designation of such a zone. The compulsory charging stage of an ADZ should not be seen as an ongoing revenue source for subsidising the police and the local authority. Local businesses are genuinely concerned that that might be a perverse incentive. Despite the review process, it might benefit a local authority not to find in favour of terminating an alcohol disorder zone even though the situation is under control and things are working well. What provisions are there to compel local authorities to end an alcohol disorder zone?

James Clappison: Amendment No. 144 caught my eye. I asked the Minister in a brief intervention how the Government proposed to judge the success or otherwise of the various measures relating to alcohol disorder zones. The amendment, which the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green described as a sunset clause, as it automatically brings the alcohol disorder zone to an end after 12 months, returns me to that line of thinking.
It is all very well for us to pass all this legislation to create all these orders, new instruments, and new charges on businesses but, at the end of the day, we  want to know whether they are a success. The Minister needs to tell us more about how the Government propose to judge whether they are a success, and what she expects to come about as a result of them. She will take on board the point made by the hon. Lady that we do not want the legislation to be just another mechanism whereby charges are levied on businesses, but no real difference is made and there is no improvement in the amount of alcohol-generated disorder in our great cities, particularly in our great provincial cities, late at night at weekends. We need the Government to tell us how they will judge whether the legislation is a success, because that is what we want on behalf of our constituents. We want this problem to be tackled; we do not want legislation that does not contribute to solving the problem.

Hazel Blears: I understand where hon. Members are coming from and I accept that their amendments are designed to probe the Government’s intentions to ensure that there are sufficient checks on the actions of local authorities and the police, and to ensure that there is full and proper consultation about what happens.
The hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green said that the variation in clause 14(3) meant that premises to which the zone was extended would not have the opportunity to go through the proposal and the designation, so would not have the opportunity to get their house in order. If she reads clause 14(3) carefully, she will see that it says:
“If a local authority consider that the locality designated by an alcohol disorder zone should be varied, they may ... make a proposal for the purposes of section 13”.
That means that it must make a proposal in accordance with the original procedure in clause 13, so premises to which it would be extended would have exactly the same opportunity as others to make their representations and be included in the plan. The phrase
“make a proposal for the purposes of section 13”
is sufficient to give the hon. Lady what she wants, which is for people to have a genuine chance to change their ways and get their house in order. I hope that that deals with her point.
It is important that the local authority has a power to make a variation, because there may well be unforeseen displacement of activity. If an alcohol disorder zone is drawn in one place, problems might emerge elsewhere. It is therefore right to give local authorities the flexibility to vary the zone, subject to consultation.
Amendment No. 167 would introduce a reasonableness test. I have dealt with that issue before and I understand the hon. Gentleman’s reason for tabling the amendment.
The Liberal Democrat amendment No. 143 would remove the power for us to make regulations. Again, that is not appropriate, as it would reduce the flexibility of the police and local authorities to attack these very real problems. We are as confident as we can be that the procedures that we are introducing are the  right ones, but matters that have not been considered before will inevitably be thrown up when ADZs are designated, hence the need for flexibility. Some procedures will be for guidance; others may well need to be written into regulations.
Amendment No. 144 would require automatic termination of the designation a year after the beginning of compulsory charging. I know what the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green wants to achieve; a year is a long time, and possibly only a handful of alcohol disorder zones will still be in existence 12 months on. The very reason for including a review after three months—which is very early in legislative terms—is to ensure a constant focus on the area, rather than allowing the designation to run and run. I do not want to accommodate the appalling behaviour that the provisions are intended to deal with. We must prevent it and return the areas in question to the decent people who are in the majority.
The hon. Member for Hertsmere has asked me before what success will look like. Success will be when decent people can go into the town centre for a meal, to visit the theatre or to have a drink in a pub without facing a rampaging mob of 30 to 50 people who are completely out of control. Unfortunately, many people of perhaps similar ages to members of the Committee are now reluctant to go to city centres. A few weeks ago I went to a matinee performance at the theatre. I should not feel forced to go to a matinee because I am reluctant to be in the city centre at 9 or 10 o’clock in the evening. A matinee might be quite nice, but I should like to feel able to go in the evening without fear of being surrounded by people whose behaviour is out of control.
That would be one sign of success; so would a reduction in the incidence of low-level violence. Figures for recorded crime might go up, because police were catching more of it, but there would be a sense that our town and city centres were under control and that people could have a relaxed night out and enjoy themselves without the possibility of encountering antisocial behaviour.

Lynne Featherstone: The amendments were probing amendments intended to test the Governments’ intentions and find out the measures of success. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 14 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 15 - Functions of local chief officer of police

Hazel Blears: I beg to move amendment No. 80, in clause 15, page 13, line 36, at end insert
‘and to the police authority for the police area in which the locality to which the proposal relates is situated.’.

Eric Forth: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment No. 81.

Hazel Blears: Clause 15 sets out the functions of the chief officer of police in relation to the designation of zones. Subsection (1) makes it the duty of a local authority to consider whether to make a proposal. The amendments would reinforce the role of police authorities, which are responsible for the effective and efficient policing of their areas. Clearly, in an alcohol disorder zone there will be extra policing, for which a charge will be made, through the charging provisions. Therefore, it is right that the police authority as well as the local authority should be involved in the procedure for designating an alcohol disorder zone.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment made: No. 81, in clause 15, page 14, line 3, at end insert
‘and to the police authority for his police area.’. —[Hazel Blears.]

Clause 15, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16 - Guidance about the designation of zones

Hazel Blears: I beg to move amendment No. 82, in clause 16, page 14, line 17, at end insert—
‘()persons he considers represent the interests of police authorities;’.

Eric Forth: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 188, in clause 16, page 14, line 22, at end insert—
‘(3A)The Secretary of State may not issue guidance until a draft of it has been laid before, and approved by resolution of, both Houses of Parliament.’.

Hazel Blears: The amendment follows the previous group in recognising fully the role of police authorities in the administration of alcohol disorder zones. It has been tabled in response to representations that we have received from the Association of Police Authorities.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 16, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 18 - Power of police to require review of premises licence

James Clappison: I beg to move amendment No. 46, in clause 18, page 15, line 27, leave out ‘serious’.

Eric Forth: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 48, in clause 18, page 15, line 27, leave out
‘or serious disorder, or both’.
No. 47, in clause 18, page 15, line 28, leave out ‘serious’.
No. 177, in clause 18, page 15, line 28, leave out ‘serious disorder’.

James Clappison: We come to a different subject—licence reviews. In amendment No. 46, we ask what will happen if there is a summary review on the application of a police officer. As the Committee will know, the Bill introduces a new procedure, under which the police can apply for a summary review if they are not satisfied with the way in which premises are being run. To make such an application, a senior police officer must give
“a certificate that it is his opinion that the premises are associated with serious crime or serious disorder”.
The amendments are intended to probe the meanings of serious crime and serious disorder in this context.
Serious crime is defined in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, but the expression “serious disorder” appears nowhere in statute, although it has been used in three judgments involving a finding of serious disorder. However, none of those is entirely helpful in the context of alcohol disorder. For the assistance of the Committee, I can say that one of those occasions was during the miners’ strike. Another was during an episode involving the WOMBLES—the White Overalls Movement Building Libertarian Effective Struggles. The last was during a Labour party meeting in Wales, although the Minister will be relieved to know that it was in the 1960s, in Pembrokeshire. Indeed, despite using a definition of serious disorder, the judge found that there had not, in fact, been serious disorder on that occasion, although there had been disorder. We could not imagine that happening today, could we, Mr. Forth? None the less, we need a little detail from the Minister about what the word “serious” means in this context.

Hazel Blears: Presumably, the hon. Gentleman’s reference to WOMBLES was not to the warm and cuddly type that we used to see, but to something entirely different.
Clause 18 inserts two new sections in the Licensing Act 2003 so that there can be an expedited review in specified circumstances. As the hon. Gentleman said, the review will come about where there is serious crime and/or serious disorder. New section 53A(4) provides that the definition of serious crime is that used in section 81 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. That definition has two limbs. First, serious crime is an offence for which a person over 21, with no previous convictions, could reasonably be expected to be sentenced to prison for three or more years. That is a pretty clear definition of serious crime. The second limb, which is probably more relevant in the context of the Bill, provides that serious crime includes
“the use of violence, results in substantial financial gain or is conduct by a large number of persons in pursuit of a common purpose.”
It therefore covers any crime involving violence, and that is exactly what the Bill is aimed at—incidents involving violence and serious crime, such as the use of guns, or the significant presence of drugs on premises. That is why we have an expedited review.
The definition is therefore quite wide ranging. It has the advantage that the police are used to using it and quite comfortable with it. Amendments Nos. 46 and 47 would, however, loosen the criteria by enabling an  expedited review to be sought where any crime or disorder, rather than serious crime or serious disorder, was involved. Amendments Nos. 48 and 177 would tighten the criteria by removing the words “serious disorder”, so that we would be left with just serious crime. None of those changes is appropriate. Amendments Nos. 46 and 48 would take out the term “serious” so that we were left with just crime and disorder. We are considering an expedited review in which a local authority has to decide within 48 hours whether it is appropriate to introduce interim steps, such as having extra doormen or searching for drugs or weapons. Serious circumstances are envisaged, such as those inside a nightclub where guns are being used and urgent action needs to be taken. We have set the criteria at a fair level of serious crime or disorder.
There is already a mechanism in the Licensing Act 2003 for the police to instigate an ordinary review of a premises licence using the ordinary procedure. Here, we are talking about a situation of a different order: an expedited review in which interim steps have to be considered. I am a bit puzzled by the removal of “serious disorder”. That would make the power less flexible, because we would be left simply with serious crime. It takes us back to the point that we have discussed several times, about whether the powers should cover both crime and disorder.
The hon. Member for Hertsmere has provided some interesting examples of how the courts have previously considered issues relating to disorder and serious disorder. This is not a new and strange concept, as some have sought to say earlier in the debate. The courts, the police and the local authorities are pretty familiar with issues that fall within the definitions of disorder and serious disorder. Therefore, we have tried to pitch the powers at the right level—where there is a serious problem, an expedited review is a fairly tough power enabling immediate action to be taken. I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.

James Clappison: This has been a useful debate. The purpose of the amendments was to explore the Government’s thinking, and we have done that, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 19 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 20 - Offence of persistently selling alcohol to children

Amendment made: No. 83, in clause 20, page 21, line 12, leave out subsection (3).—[Hazel Blears.]

Clause 20, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 21 - Closure notices for persistently selling alcohol to children

Amendments made: No. 84, in clause 21, page 21, line 27, leave out from ‘if’ to the end of the subsection and insert—
‘(a)there is evidence that a person (‘the offender’) has committed an offence under section 147A in relation to those premises;
(b)the relevant officer considers that the evidence is such that, if the offender were prosecuted for the offence, there would be a realistic prospect of his being convicted; and
(c)the offender is still, at the time when the notice is given, the holder of a premises licence in respect of those premises, or one of the holders of such a licence.’.
No. 85, in clause 21, page 22, line 28, leave out ‘7’ and insert ‘14’.—[Hazel Blears.]

Clause 21, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 22 - Directions to individuals who represent a risk of disorder

Hazel Blears: I beg to move amendment No. 86, in clause 22, page 24, line 42, after first ‘is’, insert—
‘(a)’.

Eric Forth: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment No. 161, in clause 22, page 24, line 42, leave out ‘is likely’ and insert ‘will’.
Government amendment No. 87.
Amendment No. 178, in clause 22, page 24, line 44, after ‘disorder’, insert ‘by that person’.
Amendment No. 52, in clause 22, page 25, line 23, at end insert—
‘(e)from attending the offices of his legal advisers by appointment; or
(f)from attending his normal place of worship.’.
Amendment No. 53, in clause 22, page 25, line 30, after ‘who’, insert ‘unreasonably’.

Hazel Blears: The clause provides the police with a new power to issue a direction to an individual to leave a locality if the presence of that individual is likely to cause or contribute to the occurrence or continuance of alcohol-related crime or disorder in that locality. The aim is simple; it is to minimise the risk of alcohol-related crime and disorder.
Amendments Nos. 86 and 87 amend the test that will be applied by the constable when considering whether to issue a direction. They introduce an explicit necessity test, so that the direction to leave should be given only if it is necessary to prevent alcohol-related crime or disorder. The test that will apply as a result of the amendment will be that the presence of the individual in that locality is likely, in all circumstances, to cause or contribute to the occurrence of alcohol-related crime or disorder in that locality, or to cause or to contribute to a repetition or continuance thereof and that the giving of a direction under this section to that individual is necessary for the purpose of  removing or reducing the likelihood of there being such crime or disorder in that locality during the period for which the direction has effect.
It will be for the police to decide on the area or locality from which an individual should be excluded. That might be the operational area that needs to be policed during the evening in the entertainment district of a city centre where all the pubs and clubs are, and the test might be applied by the police within that area when they consider that an individual’s presence would contribute to crime and disorder in that area. The direction will have to be given in writing by the police and may require the individual to leave the area immediately or by such time as the police may specify.

Lynne Featherstone: Amendment No. 161 would take out the word “likely” in clause 22(2) and replace it with the word “will”. It is a matter of raising the bar, because clause 22 allows the police extremely broad powers to give directions to people to leave an area.
Although I appreciate that Government amendment No. 87 tightens the directions, I am not sure that it goes far enough. A breach of such an order after 24 hours is a criminal offence, which moves the bar further into criminal procedure. However, the main problem is that the person who is subject to the order does not necessarily under the test in subsection (2) have to be involved in or the cause of the disorder. It would be sufficient for a police officer simply to judge it likely that a group of young people or an individual would contribute at some point in the future to disorder. As the sanction ends in a criminal offence, we believe that the definition should be tightened up.
Similarly, we would suggest that no offence needs to be committed, merely disorder, to justify making the direction should there already be evidence of disorder or rowdy behaviour such as that described in earlier discussions. Furthermore, the criminal offence of being disorderly—in addition to public order offences, offences of violence and criminal damage and even antisocial behaviour orders—exists to restrain drunken criminal behaviour. Anyone can be seen as posing a risk of disorder, and we do not have a time machine to see into the future.
Exercise of the power could interfere with the convention on human rights, noticeably under article 11 and article 2 of protocol 4, which protect freedom of movement. The test in clause 22(2) is difficult to determine as a matter of objective fact and we are concerned that such broadness of power might be applied arbitrarily—on grounds of ethnicity or clothing, for example. It may be that disorder is caused among drunken people by the mere sight of someone they do not like. To direct an individual to leave a locality may well be for that individual’s protection, but they will not be the cause.

Sally Keeble: Does the hon. Lady accept that in a case such as the one I raised earlier, if a young man is quite drunk at half past nine and causing bad behaviour, the police can currently issue him with a fixed penalty notice or arrest him, whereas this provision gives the option of directing him out of the area? That seems a good way  of preventing him from spending four extra hours drinking and almost certainly getting into further problems.

Lynne Featherstone: The hon. Lady makes a reasonable point, but that was not the point that I was addressing. The point was that an individual might be directed to leave a location because of the risk posed by others who are intoxicated; they might be attacked because of their clothing or their ethnicity. It seems unfair that such individuals should be asked to leave a locality if they have not been drinking. It is the opposite of what the hon. Lady suggests.

Sally Keeble: Does the hon. Lady not accept that one of the problems is that people do not go into areas because they are afraid of binge drinkers? The people of whom she speaks are likely not to be there. The real problem is the people who go there, who need to be moved out of the area.

Lynne Featherstone: We shall have to disagree. The amendment is a probing one, to test whether the provision is unfair on individuals who are not drunk and who are not the direct cause of the disorder.
The police have expressed concern because it is unclear whether they need to inform parents of under-18 who are directed to leave such an area. I should be grateful if the Minister clarified that point and said how that would be done.
I have another concern about the age limit. I understand the that the phrase “appears to be 18 or over” is used in similar legislation to safeguard officers, so that if they wrongly presume that someone is over 18 they will not be caught out. Will the Minister explain why such a provision is not included in the Bill?

Sammy Wilson: I do not share the concerns expressed by the hon. Lady. However, I am concerned about the practicalities. It may seem to be an easier way of dealing with people when there are fears they may cause disruption later in the evening. The police officer has to give instructions. We should not forget we are dealing with a group of unruly youths or people who are working themselves up to be extremely unruly.
Once the officer has identified them, he will want to get them out of the area. He has to give them a note—it must be given in writing. They have to be told in what direction they should leave the area. They may not be capable of walking in a straight line, let alone taking the prescribed route given by the officer. The officer must draw for them the locality that they must stay out of, and he can impose requirements on the manner in which they leave the locality.
I can see the sense of having such a power, but I do not know how practical it will be, given the situation on the streets that the Minister wants to deal with. I would like some indication of whether it has been run past the police. What view have the police given on how an officer on the street might implement this? If we make it law, then find that it cannot be delivered, we will have made life more difficult for the police.

James Clappison: The hon. Gentleman makes a good point about the practicality of the proposal. As with the Bill’s other proposals, they will be judged on their practicality and their contribution to reducing disorder.
I do not go with the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green along all the avenues that she explored. I strain to see how the question of ethnicity or human rights comes into it, although human rights seems to creep into many measures nowadays.
It is important for the hon. Lady to take on board—I am sure that she has—the fact that no offence will be committed until the person concerned has failed to comply with the direction given by the police officer. After a little research, I found many comparable provisions under which people are expected to comply with directions given by police officers. However, as the Minister said, the provision in clause 22 is hedged around with conditions. Under subsection (4), directions may not be given that would prevent an individual from having access to the place where he lives and going to work; there are four other things that a person cannot be prevented from doing.
We have tabled an amendment simply to explore the issue of enabling somebody to attend his place of worship. We do not want one of the directions to prevent somebody from attending his place of worship—presumably at a later stage, after the direction has been given, when the disorder has died down. We would like to know the Minister’s thinking on that point.

Hazel Blears: I had hoped that Government amendments Nos. 86 and 87 would satisfy the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green that we have considered the matter carefully to ensure that there is a necessity test. The powers will be operated fairly and with regard to people’s rights in the circumstances. It has to be necessary to issue the direction, which makes a real connection between someone’s behaviour and the exercise of the power. As my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton, North (Ms Keeble) has said, we are talking about a range of powers to ensure that there can be early intervention to stop problems escalating into the kind of serious violence that we see. If a problem starts on the street, a police officer can think about whether a fixed penalty notice is appropriate. It may well be, but if a gang forms, the police officer might need to intervene and use the power to disperse people from that area in order to bring a sense of the rule of law to those streets and to ensure that they are properly reclaimed. We seek to give the police a range of powers that it might be appropriate to use.
The hon. Member for East Antrim (Sammy Wilson) rightly raised the issue of whether what we are planning is practical. If people are in the early stages of drunkenness, it might be possible to issue a direction or a fixed penalty notice. If they have gone beyond that point and are on the verge of unconsciousness—unfortunately that does happen on the streets—it may be necessary for the police to arrest and prosecute  them and take other action. Again, the police officer will have to make a judgment about the practical steps that he or she can take.
We find that in those circumstances the police are grateful that they can take a range of measures. In the past, they had only the option of prosecution or doing nothing. That is a difficult choice to make when they are faced with 30 or 40 people on the street and are trying to restore order. Now they will have a range of tactics, which means that they do not simply have either to prosecute or do nothing. They will find that extremely useful. There have been discussions with the police throughout. Stakeholders have broadly welcomed the powers and there is a great deal of support for them. I am sure that the police will be able to exercise their discretion properly. This power will be a useful addition to the powers of the police when it comes to dealing with problems of alcohol disorder.
Amendment No. 52, from the Conservatives, is about a person having access not just to a place of worship, but to their legal advisers. I am sorry, but I am not minded at all to exempt somebody from the direction because he needs to see his solicitor. If he needs to do that, he can rearrange his appointment. He may well be seeing his solicitor about some rather unfortunate behaviour that he indulged in the night before. I am sure that he can reorder his life. On someone having access to their normal place of worship, I gave an undertaking to consider that issue in relation to a previous, similar amendment on drinking banning orders. I certainly undertake to consider the matter. If people are genuinely going to a place of worship, that can help them combat some problems that they might have with alcohol misuse and I would not want to prevent that from happening.
Amendment No. 53 relates to an individual “unreasonably” failing to comply with a direction to leave. Again, I want to resist that amendment. The offence has to be simply the failure to comply. I do not want to leave a loophole so that people can wriggle out of their responsibility to comply with the direction. It is an expedient power and I want to see it properly used by the police. I ask hon. Members to consider those issues and not to press their amendments.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment made: No. 87, in clause 22, page 24, line 43, leave out from ‘occurrence’ to end of line 44 and insert
‘of alcohol-related crime or disorder in that locality, or to cause or to contribute to a repetition or continuance there of such crime or disorder; and
(b)that the giving of a direction under this section to that individual is necessary for the purpose of removing or reducing the likelihood of there being such crime or disorder in that locality during the period for which the direction has effect or of there being a repetition or continuance in that locality during that period of such crime or disorder.’.—[Hazel Blears.]

Clause 22, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 23 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 24 - Using someone to mind a weapon

John Thurso: I beg to move amendment No. 147, in clause 24, page 26, line 13, after ‘he’, insert ‘intentionally’.

Eric Forth: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:
No. 185, in clause 24, page 26, line 15, leave out from ‘facilitate’ to ‘the’ in line 16.
No. 148, in clause 24, page 26, line 24, leave out
‘or be likely to involve or to lead to’.
No. 149, in clause 24, page 26, line 25, at end insert
‘or is intended by him to be used in the course of the commission of an offence’.

John Thurso: We come to part 2 of the Bill and the important questions of firearms control and legislation.
I preface my remarks by saying that I abhor gun crime and the misuse of guns. The crime that comes from the misuse of guns in society is an evil that everybody on all sides of the Committee will want to combat. In the past I have supported legislation and I shall continue to support appropriate legislation. I also point out—this is possibly an interest that I am declaring—that I am a shotgun certificate holder and a firearms certificate holder. I have charge of a number of weapons that are used for a variety of legitimate purposes. As a legitimate gun owner, I welcome strong controls because they enable me to operate within the law and in a proper manner.

Stephen McCabe: I have a straightforward question. Will the hon. Gentleman, as a firearms certificate holder and the owner of a shotgun, tell me how one can unintentionally ask someone to look after one’s weapon?

John Thurso: If I may continue to develop the argument, I intend to come to precisely that point. As a legitimate weapon user, I am concerned that when we come to legislate, we do so effectively and do not put forward legislation that has the unintentional consequence of depriving legitimate users of the ability to use their weapon, while failing to tackle those who would seek to use guns illegally.
We must focus on illegal use. I am sure that there are many Members in the Committee who have been briefed on the availability of illegal weapons. Those weapons are not registered, nor are they part of the legal system, but they can be purchased. I have been briefed on the pistols, machine guns and all sorts of weapons that can be acquired openly in some areas. We must ensure that the legislation we pass achieves what we seek to achieve.
I have just gone through the firearms certificate renewal process. I have had to obtain two referees and, as I am sure most members of the Committee will know, a report from my doctor. That was the difficult bit. I shall be interviewed by firearms officers in Thurso, who will visit the sites at which the weapons  are kept. They will test the security of the sites and ensure—they have asked me to certify this—that there is nobody who has access to those sites who is not also a firearms certificate holder. For example, as my wife has a shotgun certificate but not a firearms certificate, she can access one gun cabinet that holds shotguns, but she cannot access another cabinet that holds certificated firearms—[Interruption.] Mr. Forth will I am sure understand that one must have a duty of security with such things, and that there are thresholds that one must consider.
The important point to which I wish to draw the Committee’s attention is that there is a great deal of legislation. Since I first held a certificate during the late 1960s and early 1970s, there has been a considerable mass of legislation and a lot of control now exists.
Through the amendments, I am seeking to find out the Government’s thinking and work out whether we are overstepping the mark or whether we have got the balance right. Amendment No. 147 would insert the word “intentionally” into subsection (1)(a) so that it would read
“A person is guilty of an offence if—
(a)he intentionally uses another to look after, hide or transport a dangerous weapon”.
The hon. Member for Birmingham, Hall Green asked me how it can be that one could do this unintentionally. It is actually very easily done, and I was very nearly guilty of it myself. When transporting a shotgun from A to B, a clay pigeon shoot or whatever, by car people are required to keep it in a locked boot—absolutely properly. If a person is travelling with a good friend and perfectly respectable person who does not have a shotgun certificate and at some point asks them to drive the car it may be, as nearly happened to me, that the person forgets that there is a weapon locked in the boot of the car. Under the clause, that person would have committed a crime.
We have to consider what would happen, and we are looking at terms of imprisonment of not less than five years in some cases and not less than three in others. There is a great difference between someone who is actively engaged in criminal activity and almost certainly operating with an illegal weapon, who gets someone else deliberately to transport that weapon to another point so that they can commit a murder, stick-up or whatever, and a circumstance where a legitimate gun owner may find that he or she has broken the law. We have to be careful that we do not create criminals out of people who are striving to stay within the law; we must target the legislation at those who are deliberately flouting it.

Kevan Jones: It is reassuring to see a blood and guts Liberal rather than the bleeding heart one we heard earlier. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that if the amendment were accepted, it would leave a loophole that any person engaged in a nefarious activity could use as an excuse?

John Thurso: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his sweet words. I disagree with them, but we shall leave that for another occasion.
I am not a lawyer, but I have spoken to friends with legal experience and there are a number of occasions in law where intention is required and is stated in a Bill. The concept of whether someone has intentionally done something or unintentionally allowed something to happen is accepted legally, so I see no reason why it cannot be accepted in this case. To reassure the hon. Gentleman, I am seeking to find out the Government’s thinking on the matter and if I am reassured by what the Minister says, I may well withdraw the amendment.

Jim Sheridan: Picking up from what my hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr. Jones) said, the hon. Gentleman will be aware of the tragic death in Easterhouse in Glasgow of young Andrew Morton. The man who was charged with that murder is now claiming that he did not intend to shoot that child. That could end up being a loophole for him to get off.

John Thurso: We have to make a distinction. I do not believe that he can get off. This point will come up later. If someone recklessly discharges a weapon in the way that he did, at the very least they will be guilty of manslaughter. I hope that, whatever the outcome of our deliberations, that person, who behaved—I hope I am not encroaching on something that is sub judice.

Eric Forth: Order. Hon. Members must tread carefully and be aware of the sub judice rule. We must not discuss ongoing judicial proceedings. I hope that hon. Members will bear that mind.

John Thurso: If there were a case in which someone had recklessly discharged a weapon and caused a death—such a case is particularly tragic if the death is of a toddler—I hope that the full weight of the law would be brought to bear and that they would receive an appropriate sentence. I do not think that I can go further in making my views plain.
Amendments Nos. 148 and 149 are on the same lines. They would delete the phrase
“or be likely to involve or to lead to”
from clause 24(2)(b) and replace them with the words
“or is intended by him to be used in the course of the commission of an offence”.
It is dangerous for legislators to set out in a Bill provisions relying on what is likely to involve, or lead to, something happening. We are asking for a judgment to be made prior to the commission of a crime. That worries me. The point could be reached when someone could be walking along the street and be arrested, for whatever reason. The policeman could say that he thought they were likely to go shoplifting.
We should not pass legislation that involves making a judgment on the likelihood of someone committing a crime. The amendments focus on that and change the wording to specify that the person concerned intends to use the weapon in the commission of an offence. It might be argued that there is not a huge difference  between the two approaches, and I accept that, but I think the wording in the amendment provides a slightly stronger test.
All the clauses that we are soon to consider deal with matters that are extremely serious, whether replica guns or real guns are concerned. There are some legitimate uses of guns. People have a legitimate right to have collections. I know that the Government recognise that, and I am sure that we shall work together to reach the right balance. Our job now is to get the balance between those individuals who are exercising legitimate rights and those who seek to commit crime using weapons. I want, by means of the amendments, to test the Government’s intentions.

Stephen McCabe: The point that the hon. Gentleman raises is the nub of the debate. We agree about people engaged in deliberate activities, with illegal guns, but the hon. Gentleman is saying that someone with a firearms certificate or a rightful use for a gun is a responsible person who has passed all the tests, and that there should be a special allowance for such a person when they transgress—an extra test about intention. The reality is that someone who has failed to observe the rules has shown themselves not to be a responsible person holding a firearms certificate. We are entitled to demand a higher test.

John Thurso: I am actually saying that there may be circumstances in which an individual who has gone through all the steps that I described and is a legitimate gun owner may find that they are in transgression of the new law. I do not think that that person would deserve five years in prison. Perhaps their firearms certificate should be removed; other punishments might be appropriate. It might simply be a caution that is required.
There are more deaths in a month in my constituency from dangerous driving than there have been in a decade from gun crime. I happen to live in one of the safest areas of the United Kingdom so far as gun crime is concerned, but the area commander in Rosshire recently told me about the number of deaths caused by the misuse of cars. I do not place a different value on a life that is taken by a gun from one taken by a car; that would be utterly spurious. Anyone who causes a death by whatever means should be dealt with properly under the law. Driving offences, however, have been separated into bigger breaches and minor breaches. We want there to be education as well as enforcement, and we are trying to achieve that in the Road Safety Bill. We give people the right not to acquire statutory penalties, but to go on speeding courses instead. That is the minor end of the spectrum.
The point that I am trying to make is that some gun crime offences might similarly be at the minor end of the spectrum within the total range of laws, and it is not right that we should have sentencing that puts people away for five years for committing such a crime. Yet that is possible. I hope that a judge would use the discretion that is granted, but we all know of cases in which that did not happen.
The debate is important to ensure that we get the balance right between legitimate use and deliberately setting out to commit a crime of murder or aggression.

Diane Abbott: The hon. Gentleman compares gun crime to dangerous driving in the sense that both can cause loss of life. Does he accept that the problem with gun crime in areas such as the one that I represent is that it entails not only loss of life, but a whole culture and way of life that corrodes the community and the lives of very many people? That is why the Government are introducing this legislation.

John Thurso: I am happy to agree. I know the amount that the hon. Lady has done to combat such crime and I am sure that she would agree that much of the problem is caused not by legitimate owners of weapons or even by weapons that have been stolen from the legitimate gun-owning community, but by gang members with an Uzi or a pistol, which are illegal in this country but are regularly smuggled in. The Bill will not deal with the problem to which she refers, whatever we do, although the clause would catch someone who is already committing the offence of illegally possessing a firearm and getting someone else to transport it for them.
I also agree that a certain culture has sadly developed in our society. There is a long debate, which we will not have today, about where it might have come from and about the influence of the media, film, television, and all sorts of other things. She is absolutely right that that culture is extremely worrying, but it is found among criminal elements, not among the legitimate gun-owning community. That separation can be made.
This is an important debate and I am sure that we shall return to it. I would be grateful if the Minister will respond to our questions so that we can see how the Government are thinking.

Jonathan Djanogly: I declare my interest as the owner of an air rife and a shotgun licence. I am also a member of the British Association for Shooting and Conservation, which has had a lot of input in the Bill.
The amendments in my name and that of my hon. Friends would give us the chance to consider in detail some of the problems with this part of the Bill. I shall show that many of the controls on firearms in the UK are represented by a series of haphazard and disjointed laws that unfortunately create anomaly after anomaly. Part 2 does not sort out those anomalies; instead, it builds on a series of extra burdens and administration problems without offering anything substantive in the fight against violent crime generally or gun crime specifically.
I should like to highlight the inconsistencies and show that, in places, the Government have not only reversed their position but ignored their own advice, not to mention ignoring a large amount of existing legislation. It is impossible to debate new laws controlling weapons without doing so in the context of existing laws. I have counted some 42 offences relating to weapons, and a further 17 relating to passes and  certificates, and compliance with them. We believe that the reduction of violent crime would be better served by enforcing existing legislation than by adding further layers.
In May 2004, the Home Office published “Controls On Firearms—A Consultation Paper”, commissioned by the Government. Astoundingly, the Government have not yet responded to that consultation. They have undertaken a full review, but have not published a response. Are they ignoring the findings of that review? We do not know because they have not said. Surely, any legislation should take into account that review. Changes to firearms and weapons legislation affecting more than 1 million sportsmen and women, plus the owners of up to 7 million air weapons and 30 million imitation weapons, should be soundly based on evidence, not on a perceived need to be seen to be doing something in reaction to a handful of criminal events.
The Home Office’s website states that
“The Home Office published a consultation paper in May 2004 seeking views on whether existing firearms legislation can be improved. The consultation process closed at the end of August and we will now be reflecting on responses before coming forward with proposals for further discussion.”
The Home Office’s regulatory impact assessment on the amendment to firearms legislation specifies that there were some 4,371 responses to that May 2004 consultation. However, the Opposition have so far seen nothing. In fact, I recently submitted a Freedom of Information Act request, which elicited the entirely unsatisfactory response from the Minister that there will be a review by 8 November. By that time this Committee will be long gone. This is too little, too late, and adds further weight to our grave concerns about the basis of this part of the Bill.
Surely the review should come before the new amendment just lobbed in by the Minister without a word of explanation to ban the sale of air weapons except through registered firearms dealers. Doubtless, those 4,371 consultation responses represented many hours spent by sportsmen and collectors contributing to the review, and contained many valid views and concerns. Why have they been ignored and why have we been banned from seeing them?

Eric Forth: Order. I have allowed the hon. Gentleman to range widely so far, but I am becoming a little concerned that he has not yet got round to addressing the clause or the amendment. At this stage, I would ask him to concentrate his remarks on the group of amendments that we are considering.

Jonathan Djanogly: Thank you, Mr. Forth. The background information is important because it is relevant to nearly every clause in this part of the Bill. My main point is that if we do not know what people think, how can we proceed today?
I hope that the Committee will allow me briefly to summarise the point that I was making. The Government went to consultation in 2004, then did nothing for a year, then disbanded the firearms consultative committee, then announced a new firearms consultative committee, which has not yet been formed, and finally they introduced this  legislation without evidence or consultation. That is where we are today. What I am about to say has changed since three days ago, because I am pleased to see that the Government have tabled several amendments that will alleviate some of our concerns. I shall come back to the fact that they filed them two days ago and we therefore saw them yesterday.
Clause 24 relates to the new offence of using someone to mind a weapon. The purpose is to make it an offence to use other people to hide or carry dangerous weapons intended for unlawful use. This is a welcome clause, and one with which we are in general agreement, save for the fact that some definitions must be tightened.
The hon. Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross (John Thurso) gave an example of how, in practice, mistakes are possible, and the clause is too unbending. I would like to give the Minister another example. There are rules about how long I could store my shotgun in someone else’s gun cabinet before its removal to a new cabinet would require notification to the police and a statement on the shotgun certificate. I appreciate that the clause contains a requirement for there to be an unlawful purpose. However, it is clear that if the unlawful purpose includes non-notification of storing a gun in a cabinet for, say, a day, the mandatory prison term would be totally inappropriate. In effect, the clause raises practical implications that have not been thought through, and I would like the Government’s assurance that they will be considered.
I support the probing amendments. The purpose of amendment No. 147 is to add clarity and certainty to a clause that creates a new criminal offence. The amendment would prevent injustices that may result from the unintended consequences of loosely drafted legislation. Given the mandatory sentences in clause 25 that apply to the offence, the insertion of “intentionally” would reinforce the requirement of criminal intent in the unlikely, but not impossible, event that another person is looking after, hiding or transporting a dangerous weapon unbeknown to the offender.
The purpose of amendments Nos. 148 and 149 is to add clarity by removing the ambiguity involved in the phrase
“or be likely to involve or to lead to”
in line 24 and adding the far more certain words
“or is intended by him to be used in the course of the commission of an offence”.
Those words would tighten the clause and confirm the requirement of criminal intent suggested by the use of “unlawful purpose”. The words
“or be likely to involve or to lead to”
are too broad and woolly, and could cause difficulties in enforcement and interpretation. It is critical to the operation and enforcement of criminal law that there is certainty, and such phrases are best avoided.
Amendment No. 185 is also intended to add clarity. It would remove the words
“or are intended to facilitate”
from line 15. That expression is open to much interpretation and is best left out. I will be interested to hear the Minister’s comments.

Hazel Blears: I am delighted to welcome the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Djanogly) to this part of the Bill. Clearly, he is an experienced shooter and possesses weapons himself. I acknowledge that I am probably more of an expert on alcohol than on shooting, so I look forward to many interesting discussions with him over the detail of the Bill.
I want to make it clear that we are dealing with the Violent Crime Reduction Bill and addressing our minds to the misuse, not legitimate use, of guns. I entirely accept that we must always be conscious that many people use guns in a perfectly responsible way. We are aiming at the minority of people who use guns in an unlawful or irresponsible way. Their guns can have an absolutely devastating impact on communities, as has been illustrated by my hon. Friend the Member for Hackney, North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott) in this debate and in many of the campaigns she has undertaken. I have met people who have been the victims of gun crime, and no experience can be more traumatic or devastating.
We are discussing the misuse of guns. As in the previous section when we discussed the misuse of alcohol, we recognise that 95 per cent. of people do things properly. The Bill is aimed at mischiefs, and it is important that we always have that in mind.
 Amendment No. 147 would introduce an express requirement for an element of intent in using another person to look after a weapon. Inserting the word “intent” would add nothing to the drafting. As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hall Green asked, how can one use something without intent? It is tautology to seek to insert the word “intent”, because one cannot use someone inadvertently.

John Thurso: We genuinely want this Bill to reach the statute book, so this is not about opposing the legislation, but about ensuring that it is right. The Minister talks about using a person; will she expand on that point? It may be that someone who uses a person deliberately sets out to do something, but does she contend that the drafting satisfies what I seek, which is a sort of test of intent?

Hazel Blears: If the hon. Gentleman considers the whole of clause 24(1), he will see that the first limb of the offence, in paragraph (a), is that someone uses somebody else to
“look after, hide or transport a dangerous weapon”,
and the second limb, in paragraph (b), is that they do so under arrangements
“that facilitate, or are intended to facilitate, the weapon’s being available to him for an unlawful purpose.”
Both limbs must be fulfilled. If someone uses someone else to hide a weapon, they must intend that that is what they will do. That is the element of intent that I am trying to explain. If one uses someone to carry one’s bag, one must intend that they will carry the bag; if one uses someone to hide one’s gun, one must intend that they will hide it or look after it. We then come to  paragraph (b), which sets out the circumstances in which that becomes an offence. I hope that that reassures the hon. Gentleman that there must be an unlawful purpose.
The hon. Member for Huntingdon made another point about unlawful purpose. One must use another person, and there must be an unlawful purpose. Those two limbs should, we hope, be enough.

John Thurso: I am grateful and apologise to the Committee for going into this in a little detail, but I think that we can resolve the matter. If I understood the Minister’s point, it was that someone must set out to use someone else, so in the scenario that I brought up, in which someone unintentionally left a weapon in a car, they would not have used anybody, and that satisfies my point. If that is the case, this will be an extremely useful dialogue if there is ever a Pepper v. Hart requirement in relation to the Bill.

Hazel Blears: What I have established is that if one inadvertently let someone else drive one’s car with a weapon in it, that would not be for an unlawful purpose, so the test in paragraph (b) would not be fulfilled.
Amendment No. 185 seeks to remove from paragraph (b) the second scenario—that the weapon is intended to be used for an unlawful purpose—which would reduce its effect.
Amendments Nos. 148 and 149 would make it more difficult successfully to prosecute offenders for using other people to mind weapons for them. The clause requires that the minding of the weapon would facilitate the weapon being available for an unlawful purpose. In many cases, the mere possession of the weapon by the offender would be such a purpose, because possession of an illegal weapon is clearly unlawful, so it would not need to be used in a further unlawful act, as its mere possession would be sufficient to complete the offence. If one gives such a weapon to another person to look after for them, an offence is committed in the round.
The introduction of the mandatory five-year sentence for carrying illegal firearms has, in many cases, changed the behaviour of people who habitually carry such firearms. They know that if they are caught with such a weapon in their possession, they will go to prison for five years, so they increasingly use other people to hide and transport them, because they think they will then escape the mandatory sentence.
The huge rise in offences involving imitation weapons also shows that the mandatory sentence has affected people’s behaviour. The use of real weapons is going down. Our latest crime statistics, released today, show that the use of shotguns and handguns has gone down and the use of imitation weapons has risen. People are changing their behaviour as a result of the measures, and it is becoming quite common for people to use others to hide their weapons. Indeed, there is an growing issue with people using children to hide weapons, in the hope that they can evade responsibility for their actions.
If we took out the reference to weapons being
“likely to involve or to lead to ... the commission ... of an offence”,
as the hon. Member for Huntingdon wants, it would be more difficult for prosecutions to succeed, because we would tighten the tests in the Bill and water down the clause’s effectiveness at a time when, as I said, passing weapons has become almost commonplace. We are trying to cover a range of scenarios in our fight against violent crime, because criminals often change their behaviour as a result of the provisions that we introduce. We must therefore have a wide enough definition to deal with the behaviour that our law is aimed at.
I hope that hon. Members feel that we have identified a real mischief here. In many of our communities, people are hiding lethal weapons—often with children—and we seek to ensure that they cannot evade the full force of the law by this subterfuge. The provisions are not aimed at the decent, law-abiding majority who have proper certificates for their firearms and who act responsibly. There is a real mischief here, which needs to be dealt with properly and firmly so that people do not evade the law or their responsibility for actions that can be devastating for many of our communities. I therefore ask hon. Members not to press their amendments.

Diane Abbott: We heard earlier speakers—experienced hunters and shooters—talk of the importance of seeking a balance between the activities of the law regarding a minority and the criminality that the clause is designed to address. It is right that we seek a balance, but I hope that my comments can pull the balance in a slightly different direction.
The important point to make to Opposition Members is that the type of gun crime that we see in the inner city is qualitatively different from that which we have seen in the British Isles since the second world war. People have always used guns to commit crime in this country, and there have always been professional armed robbers, but the gun crime that has emerged in inner London in the past 10 or 15 years is qualitatively different. It is gun crime as part of a lifestyle; it is about people who do not feel that they are dressed to go out for an evening at a nightclub if they do not have their weapon; it is about people who use guns in a way that professional criminals never did—to settle petty disputes that arise because someone has not let them into a nightclub, has been rude about their girlfriend or has brushed up against their new suit.
Members may think I exaggerate, but if Metropolitan police officers were here, they would describe shooting after shooting that was an example not simply of crime, but of so-called respect crimes, in which people were enforcing their status in their gang or community by using a gun. The tragic fact is that the majority of gun crime in London is not about crime at all, but about respect crimes. The gun culture, which glorifies the gun, is at the heart of such crimes. We are talking about something that is qualitatively different from what Britain has seen before.
When we talk about minding weapons, we are talking in many cases, as the Minister said, about people using children. In recent days, a big cache of  weapons was found in a child’s bedroom in London. When someone uses a child to hide a weapon, it is not simply a question of their trying to conceal their criminal activity. What are they doing to that child? I represent a community in which young men see the man with the man with the gold chain and the gun, or the man with ready money, as far more of a role model than any Member of Parliament or lawyer.
The clause is therefore important, not only because it aims to prevent people from concealing crime, but because it must be wrong that children are drawn into the gun culture at an early age by being used to mind guns so that people evade their sentences. The effect is greater than simply hiding crime: it draws children into a complicity with a culture that glorifies weapons. The amendments—probably tabled in good faith, as hon. Members do not understand my community any more than I understand theirs—would leave a gaping hole in the clause.
When we talk about intentionality, we have to remember that those gunmen, for reasons that I will touch on further as we progress, exercise tremendous fear over their communities. If the gunman says that he left the gun in the child’s bedroom unintentionally and the child says, “He left the gun in my bedroom unintentionally”, as does the mother, how will we prosecute?

Jonathan Djanogly: I understand where the hon. Lady is coming from. I am certainly not speaking against the clause, and I am not sure whether the hon. Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross is either. I think that she might like to reconsider her general approach to our comments. Yes, we have been talking about narrowing the clause, but she must appreciate that we are talking about a mandatory five-year sentence. Intention can come into it. Life is not a series of perfect situations.

Diane Abbott: We are indeed talking about a mandatory sentence. My hon. Friend the Minister explained how mandatory sentencing has had an effect on such crimes. I am afraid that if we bring intention into the clause, the people whom it is meant to target would evade prosecution by being able to frighten people into supporting them in saying, “It was all an accident; it was all a mistake. I did not know that it was in the kid’s bedroom. It was unintentional.”

Sammy Wilson: Does the hon. Lady accept that in the scene that she paints—with which I have total sympathy, especially as I have seen exactly the same excuse used in places in Northern Ireland—the gun is probably illegal anyhow and would therefore not be covered by the clause? Indeed, there would be other ways of dealing with that crime, because whether the gun was hidden intentionally or unintentionally, it should not have been in anyone’s possession since there was no firearms certificate for it.

Diane Abbott: That is perfectly true. However, the fact remains that the clause is designed to address, in my view, the increasing practice in the city of using children and girlfriends to mind guns. The Opposition amendments would leave unacceptable loopholes in the legislation. It is hard enough to bring such people to book, and we do not need legislation with loopholes in it. I oppose the amendments.

Hazel Blears: I do not think that I have anything to add to what I have said, and I ask for the amendment to be withdrawn. My hon. Friend the Member for Hackney, North and Stoke Newington made an eloquent case.
The only point that I will make is in reply to the hon. Member for East Antrim. The weapons will be illegal, but the mischief that we want to address is people seeking to evade going to prison for five years for possessing a weapon by saying, “I am not in possession of a weapon, so I cannot be prosecuted and I will not go to jail.” That is exactly what the provisions are designed to act against. From what I have heard, that has broad support across the Committee, and so I ask hon. Members to withdraw the amendment so that we can get prosecutions, so that people cannot wriggle out of their responsibilities and so that we can continue the fight against gun crime, which is proving quite successful.
As I said, the latest crime statistics today show that the shotgun offences are down and the use of handguns is down; the use of imitations is up, but fatalities are also low. That is a matter of great encouragement, but we need to do more to ensure that people are not evading the law by saying that they have put the goods into other peoples’ hands, are not responsible and cannot be sentenced appropriately.

Jonathan Djanogly: The amendments go some way to showing that more thought is needed. What came to mind when the hon. Member for Hackney, North and Stoke Newington was speaking was what would happen if a child went into a parent’s bedroom and stole the parent’s gun. The parent would have to prove that he or she had not given the gun to the child.
When discussing the five-year mandatory sentence, issues will arise that need full consideration. Although I will withdraw the amendment—

Eric Forth: Order. It is not for the hon. Gentleman to decide whether to withdraw the amendment. That is a matter for the hon. Member who moved it.

Jonathan Djanogly: On that basis, Mr. Forth, I have said my piece.

John Thurso: I reiterate what I said reasonably clearly: that the purpose of my amendment is to discover the Government’s intention. I apologise to the Committee for my slightly conversational exchanges with the Minister, but they were extremely useful because what she said in her response goes almost all the way in assuaging my great worry. The definition that she gave certainly sounded extremely useful. I am not a lawyer, I hasten to add, so I will read  her response carefully and take advice on it. However, having listened to it, I am reasonably confident that it addressed my point. I entirely understand and have great respect for her and everything she has done to combat the sort of gun crime that exists in her constituency and other inner cities, which, happily, does not exist in my part of the world.
The hon. Member for Hackney, North and Stoke Newington referred to the culture of glorifying the gun and was absolutely right that people feel that they can go out and get an Uzi or a pistol to use as an Armani fashion accessory. The one point I want to make—I would like to sit down quietly with her one day and talk about it—is that I believe that responsible, legal, law-abiding, gun-owning people do not glorify guns. They use them for specific purposes, whether sporting, pest control, deer culling and so on. I have brought up my children, who are now mostly adults, to shoot. They know that guns are kept in cases, that they are not loaded until a person is in the right position and that they are treated as dangerous weapons only to be used in the circumstance for which they are intended. That goes for the vast majority of the legal, gun-owning community.
I think the hon. Lady and I are on the same side because I want the sort of crime and the attitude to which she referred squashed. I believe in this legislation and think that it will help. However, I want to ensure that there are no unintended consequences. We all know of legislation that has had unintended consequences.

Stephen McCabe: The hon. Gentleman said that the respectable gun-owning community does not glorify guns, and I am sure that that is true in the majority of cases. However, has he ever seen a website known as “Young Shots”, which shows children in possession of guns, encourages parents to induce their children to have guns and details what they can shoot with those guns. In some cases, those children are younger than 12. Does he think that could be described as glorification? What word would he use to describe it?

John Thurso: I have not seen that website, but I have a suspicion that it is linked to the British Association for Shooting and Conservation or another such organisation. I started shooting with a .410 shotgun when I was nine and introduced my children to shooting at what I thought was the appropriate age, which was when they could sensibly handle a weapon and be instructed—around 11 for both my sons. One can impress on people of that age the need for safety and the requirements of game shooting much more easily than with older people. I have been in the field shooting with people in their 30s, and I would say that they are not as instinctively safe as either of my sons, who started at an earlier age. I do not hold with the argument that because 11-year-olds have a weapon they are glorifying the gun. They are enjoying a legitimate country pursuit and being taught to do it safely and properly; they are not being taught to glorify the gun. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lynne Featherstone: I beg to move amendment No. 150, in clause 24, page 26, line 27, leave out paragraph (a).

Eric Forth: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 201, in clause 24, page 26, line 27, after ‘part’, insert ‘(being pressure bearing parts)’.
No. 202, in clause 24, page 26, line 27, after ‘part’, insert ‘of an air weapon’.

Lynne Featherstone: The amendment is short. I am not clear from reading subsection (3)(a)—I am not sure that I understand it—whether an air weapon is a “dangerous weapon”. The subject goes to the heart of our discussions on age and weapons, and it will come up repeatedly, so I would welcome the Minister’s confirmation of whether or not an air weapon is deemed to be dangerous.

Jonathan Djanogly: As I read it, the amendment would result in the provision covering only blades and knives rather than firearms. I wonder what the Minister has to say about that. If I am right, we will not support it. The clause should apply to firearms.
On amendment No. 201, there is no legal definition of a component part of a firearm. The Home Office consultation paper of May 2004, “Controls on Firearms”, states:
“we consider component parts are those elements necessary to the action of the gun, such as trigger mechanisms, barrels, frames etc. but not screws, springs, nuts, bolts, etc. which may be used for other purposes. We invite views on the value of producing a statutory definition”.
I would be grateful if the Minister would give us her views. After further consultation, it seems to be generally understood in the trade to mean any part that is pressure bearing. It is necessary and desirable to have a clear and unambiguous definition of component part.
Amendment No. 202 deals with another problem. The Bill is ambiguous on whether “component part” in subsection (3)(a) refers to the component part of an air weapon only or to any component part of any firearm. If it is intended to cover the component parts of air weapons only, a workable definition would be preferable. We suggest inserting “of an air weapon” after “component part”.

Hazel Blears: I agree with the hon. Member for Huntingdon that amendment No. 150 would remove firearms from the definition of dangerous weapons. That would destroy the major focus of an important measure that has been welcomed by members of the community. It closes a gap in legislation that has allowed firearm offenders to go free. I am sure that that is not the intention of the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green, and we oppose the amendment.
Amendments Nos. 201 and 202 deal with the definition of dangerous weapons, particularly with reference to air weapons. To avoid doubt, we are excluding air weapons from the scope of the provisions, and the reference to component parts relates to air weapons only.
We have identified a drafting defect in the Bill and want to make a technical amendment. By inserting the word “of” after the word “parts” in subsection (3)(a), we will make it clear that the measure relates to a component part of an air weapon rather than of any other kind of weapon. I am not sure whether we can have an “of” without tabling a formal amendment. I remember once discussing whether “and” was a conjunctive or a disjunctive word. Perhaps “of” falls into a similar category. With your leave, Mr. Forth, we could have a technical amendment to that effect.

Lynne Featherstone: The amendment is not clear—I take the Minister’s view on it—but it resulted from confusion about the drafting. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 24 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 25 - Penalties etc. for offence under s.24

Lynne Featherstone: I beg to move amendment No. 299, in clause 25, page 26, line 39, leave out ‘4’ and insert ‘10’.

Eric Forth: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:
No. 151, in clause 25, page 27, line 7, leave out subsections (4) to (8).
No. 204, in clause 25, page 27, line 7, leave out subsection (4).
No. 205, in clause 25, page 27, line 10, leave out ‘must’ and insert ‘may’.
No. 206, in clause 25, page 27, line 11, leave out ‘exceptional’.
No. 207, in clause 25, page 27, line 17, leave out ‘must’ and insert ‘may’.
No. 208, in clause 25, page 27, line 19, leave out ‘exceptional’.
No. 209, in clause 25, page 27, line 25, leave out ‘must’ and insert ‘may’.
No. 210, in clause 25, page 27, line 26, leave out ‘exceptional’.
No. 211, in clause 25, page 27, line 33, leave out ‘must’ and insert ‘may’.
No. 212, in clause 25, page 27, line 35, leave out ‘exceptional’.
No. 213, in clause 25, page 27, line 41, leave out ‘must’ and insert ‘may’.
No. 214, in clause 25, page 27, line 43, leave out ‘exceptional’.
Government new clause 19—Minimum sentence for certain firearms offences.

Lynne Featherstone: I rise to speak to amendments Nos. 299 and 151. Amendment No. 299 suggests in clause 25 on line 39 of page 26, changing,
“imprisonment for a term not exceeding 4 years”
to “not exceeding 10 years”. The amendment tests the Government’s will involving the differential value that they place between murder by gun and murder by knife. There is more equality between those two dangerous weapons than the sentencing reflects. I wanted to highlight that point, because the subsection mentions knives and bladed weapons, and in my constituency knife crime is as much an issue as gun crime. We should like to see the sentencing for knife crimes increased.
I wonder sometimes whether knife crime carries less weight because we are familiar with knives and they seem to be less serious and dangerous. I am sure that that is not the case and we must be tougher. My hon. Friend the Member for Winchester (Mr. Oaten), asking the Home Secretary an oral question the other day, said:
“The Home Secretary knows that the current sentence for carrying a gun in public is seven years but the maximum sentence for doing the same with a knife is only two years. Given that both are weapons and can kill, will the Home Secretary consider increasing the maximum sentence for carrying a knife as part of his proposals?”
The Home Secretary, to his credit, answered that he would
“be pleased to consider proposals to that effect when we debate the Bill that was mentioned in the Gracious Speech and examine specific measures.”
That is this Bill. The Home Secretary continued:
“A knife is not the same as a gun but the hon. Gentleman is entirely correct to say that we need to compare the two and ascertain whether they should be brought more in line.”—[Official Report, 23 May 2005; Vol. 434, c. 400.]
I support my hon. Friend’s question and I hope that the Government will address it, because they do not address it fully in the Bill.

Diane Abbott: Is the hon. Lady aware that there is some evidence, in east London certainly, that knife crime is supplanting gun crime? There is evidence that as the Government bear down on gun crime, young people are turning to knives precisely because the penalties are lower.

Lynne Featherstone: I was not aware of that statistic, but it does not surprise me that that would be the case. In my constituency knife crime appears to be rising, and it is widespread, possibly because of the relative ease of getting hold of a knife compared with getting hold of a gun.
Amendment No. 151 is about mandatory minimum sentences. Subsections (4) to (8) should be omitted. Mandatory minimum sentences prevent a court from taking full account of the individual circumstances of a case, which can result in disproportionate sentences in contravention of article 49(3) of the European Union charter of fundamental rights, which provides:
“The severity of penalties must not be disproportionate to the criminal offence.”
The ordinary principles of the sentencing regime can be distorted because five purposes are meant to be considered when sentences are laid down under section 142(2) of the Criminal Justice Act of 2003.

Dawn Butler: The removal of subsections (4) to (8) would contradict the hon. Lady’s suggestion that the period should be increased from four to 10 years, making the sentence for carrying knives tougher. We should consider a tougher sentence for those carrying firearms. As the Minister previously explained, gun crime has reduced since the Government introduced a minimum five-year sentence. In my constituency there is a firearm incident on average every 17 days. We should look to strengthen the Bill; removing the mandatory minimum sentence of five years would not strengthen it.

Lynne Featherstone: I take the hon. Lady’s point, but I am arguing about the distribution of justice. Seriousness, according to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, is determined by two main parameters: the culpability of the offender and the harm caused by the offence. The mandatory minimum sentence is presumably designed to echo the provision in section 51A of the Firearms Act 1968, which was inserted by the 2003 Act. The courts said that the
“purpose of the provision is to ensure that absent exceptional circumstances the courts will always impose deterrent sentences”
and that the discretion of the court would be removed by the mandatory minimum sentencing. We remain concerned that the proportionality of sentencing may be subverted by the mandatory situation in each of the cases. Courts may be obliged to pass a minimum sentence.

Dawn Butler: Again, I must stress that that would make the Bill far more woolly, which I know that the Liberal Democrats are not used to being. The hon. Lady’s changes would make a gaping hole in the Bill, when we should be strengthening it.
The hon. Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross stated previously that the five-year minimum sentence made him think twice about leaving a loaded gun in his car while his friend drove it away. By removing the mandatory minimum sentence, we will stop people thinking about the consequences of someone else carrying their firearm. We must strengthen the Bill, not weaken it, yet the hon. Lady is weakening the Bill.

Eric Forth: Order. The hon. Lady should try to make her interventions brief. There is ample time in Committee for members who seek to catch my eye to make contributions. I would appreciate it if interventions were as brief as possible.

Lynne Featherstone: It is certainly not my intention to weaken the Bill, but I am concerned that a mandatory minimum sentence may deliver injustice. There is an attempt at equivalent seriousness, and as I understand it even a different firearms offence would not attract the same sentence. A very uneven playing field would be created while sending out an appropriate message to those who are the focus of the legislation.

Stephen McCabe: I do not want the legislation to be at all woolly. Will the hon. Lady say clearly to the Committee that her intention is to oppose the mandatory sentence?

Lynne Featherstone: No, that is not my intention. I am trying to understand whether the Government have thought through the distinctions that the provision might create. Even different firearms offences do not carry that mandatory minimum sentence, so the Bill would create an inequality in the law.

Kevan Jones: I am looking with some amusement at the face of the hon. Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross. He was obviously paying great attention to the hon. Lady’s contribution. Is what she is putting forward official Liberal party policy to weaken the Bill or is it a bit of freelance enterprise on her part?

Lynne Featherstone: I have made it perfectly clear that the intention is not to weaken the Bill. The intention is to sort out some of the inequalities or unevenness that might be created by the minimum mandatory sentence. Other firearms offences do not carry such a sentence.

Kevan Jones: Is this the Liberal party’s official position or is it a freelance move on the hon. Lady’s part? Judging from the hon. Gentleman’s face, her colleague clearly has some grave reservations.

Lynne Featherstone: I am aware of my colleague’s reservations, although the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr. Jones) can see his face, whereas I cannot. This is a probing amendment to ascertain the Government’s view.

Kevan Jones: Is this official party policy? I recognise that the hon. Lady’s colleague has reservations. It was also quite amusing to see her face when he described the small arsenal that he keeps at home.

Lynne Featherstone: My experience of firearms is not so much limited as non-existent. I share with the Minister an understanding of alcohol that I do not have of firearms. I ask her to respond to my points.

Jonathan Djanogly: The clause relates to the imposition of new-length mandatory sentences that relate to the crime of using someone to mind a weapon. Although it is obvious that sentences should be severe and certain enough to act as a deterrent, we have several reservations about the clause. First, there is no evidence to support the increases and no evidence to justify the imposition of mandatory sentences. The second reservation relates to the imposition of mandatory sentences themselves from a conceptual point of a view.
On amendment No. 299, from the Liberals, we see no evidential justification for increasing the sentence to 10 years. If we were talking about judicial discretion coming into play, we might have some more sympathy, but, on the basis of mandatory sentences, I am afraid that we will not support that amendment.
However, the position changes with Liberal amendment No. 151 and our amendments Nos. 204 to 214. We have a lot of sympathy with what the hon. Lady has just been saying. The purpose of our amendments and amendment No. 151, which basically  has the same effect, is to remove mandatory sentencing and leave room for judicial discretion. Our amendments do that by removing the word “must” and replacing it with “may” and by removing the word “exceptional” in line 11. I note also that new clause 19, which the Government recently produced—I have not had the opportunity of reviewing all the implications, because it cuts across other pieces of legislation—seems to extend the minimum sentences to a whole range of offences under firearms legislation. Although I applaud the Government’s intention in moving towards some kind of consistency in the legislation, that should not be done at the expense of justice. I shall explain why.
First, where is the evidence to show that the imposition of long mandatory sentences will have an effect on violent crime reduction? That is one of our concerns. I will not outline to the Committee the well-established arguments relating to mandatory sentences and judicial discretion. However, we must remain vigilant about mandatory custodial sentences where it is preferable to allow judges discretion. In the Bill, it must be prudent, and infinitely more desirable, to allow judges discretion in order to avoid the unintended ramifications that may arise. Mandatory minimum sentences can result in disproportionate sentences, which could be in contravention of article 49(3) of the EU charter of fundamental rights. That provides that the severity of penalties must not be disproportionate to the criminal offence. For starters, surely it is not intended that the mandatory minimum sentences should apply to children. I should be grateful if the Minister would confirm that that is the case.
The mandatory minimum of five years’ imprisonment in clause 25(4) seems to echo the provision in section 51A of the Firearms Act 1968, which was inserted by section 287 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Both those sections make provision for exceptional circumstances. In the recent case of Rehman, which concerned section 51A, it was held that exceptional circumstances existed if
“to impose five years’ imprisonment would result in an arbitrary and disproportionate sentence.”
The court said that the
“purpose of the provision is to ensure that absent exceptional circumstances the courts will always impose deterrent sentences”.
Despite that judgment, there remain concerns about the proportionality of sentencing under these provisions because the result might be, in cases where exceptional circumstances cannot be made out, sentences that would not otherwise be justified. It is notable that in the case of the second appellant in Rehman, whose mandatory minimum sentence was upheld, both the sentencing judge and the Court of Appeal expressed regret or reluctance at coming to the conclusion that there were no exceptional circumstances in his case. In the case of Jordan, Alleyne, and Redfern in 2004, the Court of Appeal said  that cases of “exceptional circumstances” will be rare, and that they arise only where there are real exceptional circumstances.
That strict approach has been confirmed in a number of cases. In the case of Evans in 2005, the Court of Appeal decided that “real exceptional circumstances” had not arisen. The offender, a civilian station reception officer at Dagenham police station, had a considerable collection of guns and ammunition at his home and in the boot of his car. He was a gun enthusiast aged 55 who enjoyed shooting at a rifle range and had never been in trouble before. His gun club supplied a reference. Other referees spoke of him as a good neighbour, family man and citizen. There was also a psychological report that stated that the offender had a severe level of obsessive compulsive disorder and clinically significant levels of anxiety and depression. The Court of Appeal rejected the submission of “exceptional circumstances”. For those reasons, we propose to remove the word “exceptional” from clause 25.
The knock-on effects of this type of clause should also be borne in mind. Courts may be obliged to pass minimum sentences even though an offence of equivalent seriousness would not attract such a sentence. This clause imposes mandatory minimum sentences of five years and three years. In the case of Grainger in 1997—a manslaughter case, originally charged as murder—the victim started chanting football slogans of a team other than his, then obtained a knife and superficially stabbed himself in the chest. The offender then retrieved a kitchen knife and plunged it into the chest of the victim. The sentence given was three years’ imprisonment. Having killed someone with a knife, the offender received a sentence of only three years. How can it be fair, therefore, that for just giving someone the knife to carry he could get a mandatory minimum sentence of five years?
Again, in the case of Kitchener in 1999, the offender arrived home to discover a group of neighbours protesting about his dog and its continuous barking. The offender left his partner and children at a friend’s house, armed himself with a knife and returned home. A fight broke out in which the victim was stabbed and died. The sentence given in that case was five years’ imprisonment.
Another way of demonstrating that this clause could result in disproportionately long sentences is by comparing it to sentencing for death by dangerous driving. The guideline case—

Stephen McCabe: Surely what the hon. Gentleman is demonstrating with his examples is that in the case of the deaths, the perpetrators received appallingly low sentences for the crimes that they committed. I would be with him if we were arguing that the sentences should be increased for those crimes. However, how can that be an argument for reducing the sentence for this offence?

Jonathan Djanogly: As the hon. Gentleman will know, there is a vast difference between a judge giving long sentences having considered the circumstances of the  case and of the victim, and our simply saying that there is a minimum sentence whatever the circumstances. For this crime, it seems inappropriate that the sentence should be mandatory. As I said, compare it with death by dangerous driving. The guideline case states that a sentence of 12 to 18 months is appropriate for an offence with no aggravating features, and a sentence of two to three years is appropriate for an intermediate level of culpability. That is for death by dangerous driving.
My point is that one can receive a lower sentence for killing someone by plunging a knife into them than by keeping a collector’s gun belonging to someone else in an unused state under a bed, if there are no exceptional circumstances. I maintain that it is not desirable to impose mandatory sentences that may further increase the prison population or operate contrary to the interests of justice—that is what this discussion is about.

Kevan Jones: I was saddened to hear the hon. Gentleman’s arguments. If this will be the future of the Conservative party—soft on crime—many people out there will not vote for its candidates in the next election.

Jonathan Djanogly: The hon. Gentleman’s argument is hardly worth addressing. His dismissive attitude is, frankly, pathetic, but I ask him whether he can honestly say that a minimum sentence will be right for every set of circumstances.

Kevan Jones: My constituents and most people who are plagued by youths who use knives and sometimes cause death or major injury, or by gun crime such as that described earlier by my hon. Friend the Member for Hackney, North and Stoke Newington, want tough sentencing. They want the courts to deal with such people. They do not want excuses, which is what the hon. Gentleman is making.

Jonathan Djanogly: I am sorry to disappoint the hon. Gentleman by discussing the interests of justice, but I shall continue to do so.

Diane Abbott: The hon. Gentleman talks about the interests of justice. Will he accept that many people believe that the interests of justice are not served by the low sentences that he mentioned for death by dangerous driving? People write to me about that all the time.

Jonathan Djanogly: The length of sentence for death by dangerous driving was increased, and I supported that increase. I am talking not about the length of sentence but about judicial discretion, which is something that this Government are intent on destroying.

Dawn Butler: I have no sympathy with the hon. Gentleman’s argument. My constituency has a firearms-related incident every 17 days. The five-year minimum sentence has been working—there has been a reduction in gun crime—and the Bill addresses some of the anomalies that have come from it. We should build on the good work that the Labour Government have done in introducing the Bill. Rather than  consider the arguments of the Opposition, perhaps we should consider increasing the minimum sentence from five years to 10. I want to be tougher on crime in my area and see it reduced further. Perhaps the Minister would give that some consideration.

Hazel Blears: It appears that I am in the happy position of being a moderate between two extremes, but there is nothing extreme about my hon. Friend the Member for Brent, South (Ms Butler). She takes the matter extremely seriously and has an excellent record of campaigning on these issues. She has contributed significantly to the reduction in gun crime in her area, and has been campaigning for an increase in the mandatory minimum sentence for some time. I hope that after my explanation she will understand why we have pitched the mandatory sentence at five years, but I understand that there are strong arguments and feelings that the sentence should be higher. I have no doubt that people will continue to campaign for that.
Let me deal first with the amendments about knives. We have genuinely tried to propose sentences that are proportionate to sentences for existing offences. The penalty for having a knife is a maximum of four years’ imprisonment. At the moment, the maximum penalty for possession of a knife or blade weapon in a public place without reasonable excuse is two years’ imprisonment. We have set the maximum for that offence for knives at the higher end of the scale.
Amendment No. 299 would increase that to 10 years’ imprisonment. That would be out of step with current sentencing policies and would be disproportionate. We must ensure that we position the penalty correctly, and I believe that we are probably right. I do not seek to minimise the effect of knife crime. Indeed, provisions later in the Bill will help strengthen the power to deal with knife crime. My hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, West (Kevin Brennan) mentioned a dreadful case that happened a few days ago in his constituency of an elderly pensioner being stabbed to death. We have seen an increase in knife crime.
The courts have a range of sentences for grievous bodily harm, murder, manslaughter, assault occasioning actual bodily harm—whether with guns, knives or any other weapon. Many serious and violent crimes can bring a life sentence, and rightly so. We are talking about mandatory sentences for possession of dangerous weapons.
That brings me to amendment No. 204, which would remove the mandatory minimum sentence of five years where a prohibited firearm is involved. I cannot believe that the hon. Members for Hornsey and Wood Green and for Huntingdon should seek to remove the mandatory sentence. I am shocked. The hon. Lady spoke of justice. Justice is not for the offender only; many feel that the criminal justice system is weighted far too heavily in favour of the offender and that the victim is not at the heart of our criminal justice system. Many of our reforms ensure that victims and witnesses feel that the system is on their side.

Kevan Jones: Does my hon. Friend agree that when a Liberal focus leaflet is next put though letterboxes claiming that the Liberal Democrats are tough on crime locally, they should read what the hon. Lady said today?

Hazel Blears: I am sure that, as my hon. Friend says, many of our constituents will be fascinated to read the statements in Hansard and to discover the Liberal Democrat definition of justice. It is dangerous, in a democracy, that ordinary people should not have confidence in the criminal justice system. That is why we are so exercised to ensure that they see that it is on their side.

Lynne Featherstone: I still claim that we are tough on crime. I do not think that arguing for the criminal justice system to consider the circumstances of individual cases means that we are not tough on crime. We must not forget that if we create more crime, we will have to let people go free because our prisons will be full. Indeed, that is what the Home Secretary recently did. I am concerned that justice should be done. The Liberal Democrats are obviously tough on crime. [Laughter.]

Eric Forth: Order. The hon. Lady should not allow herself to be unnecessarily provoked by any part of the Committee. She will have an opportunity to wind up when she may briefly allude to some of the questions that were put during the Minister’s and other contributions.

Hazel Blears: The hon. Lady spent a long time talking about human rights. It is important that we balance those rights correctly. We believe that there should be a minimum mandatory sentence. It is open to the courts in exceptional circumstances to depart from that minimum. In the vast majority of cases, however, a minimum sentence will be appropriate.
The hon. Member for Huntingdon asked what evidence we have that mandatory sentences are effective. Mandatory sentences for the offence were first imposed in January 2004. If he has seen the crime statistics released today, he will have seen that during the past year the number of incidents involving shotguns has decreased by 13 per cent., that the number of incidents involving handguns has decreased by 8 per cent., and that there has been an increase in the use of imitation weapons. That clearly shows that there is a trend, and that people are aware that if they are caught in possession of an illegal gun, they will go to jail for five years. That is an incredible incentive for people not to carry illegal guns. The message from the Government is simple, clear and direct: we take gun crime very seriously. Those caught in possession of an illegal gun will go to prison, and they should make no mistake about it. That is an important message to send out.

Jonathan Djanogly: Will the Minister not at least concede that one problem with mandatory sentences is that juries are often less likely to convict? Although the  standard of proof that has to be reached is technically the same in practice, juries will be reluctant reach a guilty verdict unless guilt is even more likely.

Hazel Blears: Unlike the hon. Gentleman, I have confidence in the good people who sit on juries, who are perfectly capable of reaching proper decisions. There is a mandatory sentence for possession of firearms, which is a good offence to prove because the simple fact that someone is in possession of a firearm is the offence. Therefore, people who might have been intimidated and who might not have wanted to come forward to give evidence do not have to. The policeman’s evidence that someone was in possession of a gun is sufficient for that offence to be proven, and that person will go to prison. Decent people have been intimidated—in many cases, by violent criminals and gangsters—but they no longer have to come forward to give evidence. That is therefore a very effective provision, and it is making a difference.
I should also tell the hon. Member for Huntingdon that fatal injuries have been reduced by 14 per cent., which means that 14 per cent. fewer people are being killed as a result of the use of guns. Some of that reduction is undoubtedly down to the fact that we have a mandatory minimum sentence, which sends out a message to the community.
I am amazed that the hon. Gentleman said that some of the sentences for possession of illegal weapons were disproportionately high. I do not think that five years in prison for carrying illegal weapons is a disproportionately high sentence when we have the problem of gun crime. We need to take tough measures, and that is exactly what we are going to do; we are not going to water down the measures in the Bill, which are absolutely appropriate when it comes to dealing with the problems that face our society.
New clause 19 addresses a problem that we recently encountered, which highlights some of the issues that we have just discussed. At present, the minimum sentence is for possession of a weapon; it is designed to deter such behaviour and it is working. However, in a recent case, someone was charged with a different offence. A person can be charged with possession with intent to injure, possession with intent to cause fear of violence, carrying a firearm with criminal intent and carrying a firearm in a public place. The advice to the Crown Prosecution Service is that someone should always be charged with possession, because that carries a minimum sentence. In addition, they can be charged with those other offences. In the case that I mentioned, however, the person was charged with one of the other offences and not with the strict possession offence, so the mandatory sentence was not open to the judge.
New clause 19 therefore makes the minimum mandatory sentence apply to those other offences as well. We will not then have a situation in which somebody who has a gun is charged with possession with intent to injure, but the mandatory sentence is not available because of a technicality—namely that it applies only to the simple possession offence. The new clause therefore ensures that the minimum sentence applies to that range of offences. I am sure that the  hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green would object violently to the fact that we are providing for the minimum mandatory sentence in those circumstances, but I think that victims of gun crime will support us absolutely in making that extension.
I ask hon. Members to consider this matter carefully and not to press their amendments. Justice is important—justice for victims and witnesses, not just offenders.

Jonathan Djanogly: From what I have heard, the clause does indeed need more thought. On that basis, I shall press for a Division on amendment No. 204.

Lynne Featherstone: I welcome what the Minister said about knife crime, and we are at one on that. I support victims being looked after by our justice system. I listened carefully to what she said about mandatory minimum sentences, but question whether it is message or reality. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: No. 204, in clause 25, page 27, line 7, leave out subsection (4).—[Mr. Djanogly.]

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 4, Noes 14.

NOES

Question accordingly negatived.

Clause 25 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 26 - Age limits for purchase etc. of air weapons

Jonathan Djanogly: I beg to move amendment No. 192, in clause 26, page 28, line 30, at end insert—
‘(2)For section 1(3)(b) (Requirement of firearm certificate), substitute—
“(b)an air weapon (that is to say an air rifle, air gun or air pistol with a muzzle energy in excess of 4 joules which does not fall within section 5(1) and which is not of a type declared by rules made by the Secretary of State under section 53 of this Act to be especially dangerous)”.
(3)For the purposes of this Act, an air weapon shall have the meaning assigned to it by section 1(3)(b) of the 1968 Act.’.

Eric Forth: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 215, in clause 26, page 28, line 35, at end insert
‘which is also a realistic imitation firearm or a firearm for which a firearms certificate would be required under section 1 of the 1968 Act.’.
No. 152, in clause 26, page 28, line 36, leave out ‘seventeen’ and insert ‘eighteen’.
No. 216, in clause 26, page 28, line 41, after ‘weapon’, insert
‘which is also a realistic imitation firearm or a firearm for which a firearms certificate would be required under section 1 of the 1968 Act.’.
Government amendment No. 292
Government new clause 17—Prohibition On Sale Or Transfer Of Air Weapons Except By Registered Dealers
Government new clause 18—Sales Of Air Weapons By Way Of Trade Or Business To Be Face To Face

Jonathan Djanogly: Partly because we have seen none of the consultation, we have seen no evidence that the clause would reduce crime. The age limit for air guns was increased as recently as 2003, but the impact of that change has yet to be assessed. Also, many existing laws could be used to counter the problem if only they were better enforced. The solution is not more laws that serve only to penalise the law-abiding shooting community, but better enforcement of existing laws. Unless the Minister can alleviate our concerns and provide compelling evidence as to why the clause is necessary and how it will serve significantly to reduce violent crime, we shall consider our position at a later stage.
The clause raises from 17 to 18 the age at which a person may purchase or hire an airgun or ammunition for an airgun. It also raises from 17 to 18 the minimum age at which a person may have an airgun or ammunition without being supervised by a person aged 21 or over, and raises from 17 to 18 the minimum age at which a person may borrow an airgun or receive one as a gift.
It is worth reflecting on some of the uses of airguns. They are widely used in Britain by young people for pest and predator control, target shooting and informal target practice. On Second Reading, the shadow Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (David Davis), said that we would consult on airsoft proposals in the Bill. Well, we have done so, and we still fail to see any justification for the new clause, let alone how it will have a material impact on violent crime. Changes to firearms legislation should be soundly based on consultation and evidence, not just on a perceived need to do something. The regulatory impact assessment stated that the vast majority of the 4,371 responses to the consultation paper received by the Government that commented on air weapons were in favour of tackling misuse, but not through further restrictions on possession or sale.
There are an estimated 4 to 7 million air weapons in this country, the vast majority of which are used responsibly for target shooting and vermin control. The status of target airgun events has been raised consistently in recent years. The estimated sale of blank firers and soft airguns is about 350,000 weapons per annum.
In answer to a written question in 11 July 2005, in column 767 of Hansard, the Minister said that the first statistics for court proceedings on airguns following the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003 would be available this autumn. The proposed changes in the Bill come soon after that Act, but before there has been sufficient time to see whether the Act has had a discernable impact on airgun misuse, and with no evidential basis for the proposal.
The Anti-social Behaviour Act attempted to deal with airgun abuse by, for example, raising the age of purchase to 17. However, it is less that two years old. Its effects have not yet had time to be properly monitored and evaluated and we maintain, having consulted widely on the issue, that it is wrong to impose further restrictions in the absence of further evidence.

Stewart Hosie: I am listening carefully to what is being said and trying to work out what argument is coming next. Is the hon. Gentleman not concerned that in the last full year for which I have figures, in England there were 13,700 air weapon crimes and in Scotland there were 415, twice the number of crimes that involved real firearms. Is the hon. Gentleman not deeply concerned about the scale of the problem? There seems to be a little complacency in what he is saying—although of course I will listen to the rest of his argument.

Jonathan Djanogly: The hon. Gentleman’s line of argument is slightly misleading. I do not have the figures in front of me, but I believe that about 80 per cent. of those 14,000 offences are against property. Perhaps I am wrong; perhaps he can put me right. He is talking about young children, who should not break windows but would break them with a stone or a slingshot anyway. I do not condone such action, but we cannot say that because an air rifle was used, the holders of 7 million airguns should be considered criminals.

Diane Abbott: The hon. Gentleman is seeking to dismiss the rise in crimes involving airguns by saying that many are attacks on property. He should think of the people whose property that is. He should think of the people—maybe older people, maybe women with children—inside those homes. I find it extraordinary that he should dismiss those incidents in such a way. Such incidents can cause real fear and real physical harm to the people involved.

Jonathan Djanogly: I thank the hon. Lady for allowing me to clarify the issue. I am not in any way saying that such crimes are not serious. In fact, I personally consistently maintain that antisocial crimes are often the ones that most annoy people on a day-to-day basis, and they are the most numerous. However, I was answering the specific point made by the hon. Member for Dundee, East, which suggested that airguns were a particular problem because of the number of crimes. We have to go a little more deeply into the sorts of crimes involved.
I will move on to amendment No. 192. We propose that an air weapon should be more specifically defined not only in this Bill but throughout firearms legislation. Certain air weapons have in law not been regarded as firearms because of the consensus that airguns discharging pellets with a muzzle energy below a certain level are not regarded as lethal barrelled weapons, the definition of a firearm. In the absence of a legal definition of lethality in the 1968 Act, we suggest that it should be established that airguns discharging pellets with a muzzle energy of 4 J or less are not considered firearms because they are generally not regarded as lethal barrelled weapons. That classification includes most airsoft weapons and BB guns, which are generally used harmlessly by children and adults alike. It may also be useful at this stage to consider defining lethality and updating the definition of firearm in section 57 of the 1968 Act. For those reasons, we propose changing the definition of air weapon in the 1968 Act to reflect that and give the definition a statutory basis.

Jim Sheridan: The hon. Gentleman appears to be arguing that airguns are an inoffensive weapon. I remind him that someone—a child—has been killed in Scotland by an airgun.

Jonathan Djanogly: I am not denying that airguns are a weapon, but anything can be used as a weapon. People have been killed by cricket bats. We are discussing at what point one must prejudice the holders of 7 million airguns. If a criminal commits an offence, he must answer for his crimes, but that does not necessarily mean that one should prejudice the owners of 7 million airguns.

Kevan Jones: The hon. Gentleman paints a rosy picture of the use of airguns among children, implying that knocking slates off roofs or hitting windows are somehow just high jinks. What would he say to people whose pets are killed by irresponsible users of airguns, or to the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, which is concerned about the use of airguns, which causes a lot of damage and death among wild birds?

Jonathan Djanogly: I would say that the users should be prosecuted and, if convicted, face the sentence they deserve.
For the reasons I have given, we propose changing the definition of air weapon. Section 1(3)(b) of the Firearms Act 1968 contains a definition of an air weapon. By changing it, low-powered air weapons could escape the proposed draconian legislation. That would partly remove the need to create an exemption for the sport of airsoft, as most airsoft weapons would escape the definition of an air weapon. I believe that they have the muzzled energy of about 1 J.

Dawn Butler: If the hon. Gentleman were faced with a person with an airgun, a cricket bat or a slingshot, what would he rather they hit him with?

Jonathan Djanogly: I should not want to be hit by any of them, and I should want the person who hit me to be prosecuted, convicted and sent to prison. However, the slingshot could do the most damage, and it is not addressed by the legislation. Having heard the hon. Lady’s comments, I think that she may want her Government to address that.
The amendment, as well as clarifying the law and minimising disruption to social activities, would have the benefit of reducing the administrative burden involved in the sale and purchase of low-powered air weapons. In France, air rifles with muzzled energy of 10 J or less are on sale to anyone of any age, and air weapons with muzzled energy in excess of 10 J come under the same regulation as firearms. Will the Minister confirm whether she has considered what happens on the continent?

John Thurso: I have been following the hon. Gentleman’s argument, and I have great sympathy with it. However, I have never really caught up with the metric system, so what is the pound per square inch equivalent of the joule?

Jonathan Djanogly: I do not know, but that would confuse hon. Members anyway. Apparently, 1 J is equivalent to a tennis ball being bounced on the floor. That puts it in very simple terms that we can all understand.
If this unjustified change in the law succeeds, the amendment would minimise the effect on social sports such as airsoft and the inevitable loss of revenue to associated businesses. It would at least enable sensible, law-abiding 17-year-olds who enjoy using low-powered air weapons to continue responsibly with their sports.
The purpose of amendments Nos. 215 and 216 is to tighten the definition of air weapon, so that it does not include toys and other air weapons that are clearly not powerful enough to cause damage or realistic enough to cause any concern that they may be a real threat.
The amendments add an additional requirement so that these restrictive laws do not apply to each of the 7 million existing air weapons nor to all new air weapons, but to those air weapons that are only also realistic imitation firearms.

Diane Abbott: The hon. Gentleman argues that because the clause does not apply to slingshots, which can cause damage, it should not apply to lower-powered air weapons. Is he aware that the Police Federation, which might know more about the matter than he or I do, wants the legislation to apply to crossbows and catapults because increasingly dangerous incidents are taking place with them. I am not arguing for amendments to the Bill at this time, but the argument can be seen in a completely different light.

Jonathan Djanogly: The hon. Lady makes a fair point that I was going to bring up later. If we talk about restrictions, it is arguable that those should be the priorities.
Amendment No. 215 would have the advantage of exempting air weapons, which would not be mistaken for threatening guns, so it would be consistent with the Government’s general aims on imitation firearms. The amendment is also consistent with existing firearms legislation, particularly section 1 of the Firearms Act 1982, which provides for an imitation firearm to be treated as a real firearm in law. We have included that in relation to air weapons so that the clause does not unnecessarily affect the law-abiding pursuits and pastimes of 17-year-olds. The amendment would prevent the needless tightening of restrictions based on no supporting evidence and with no obvious impact on the reduction of violent crime.
On the Liberal Democrats’ amendment No. 152, we generally support the idea that the Bill provides the Government with a perfect opportunity to clarify and harmonise the complex and disjointed laws relating to air weapons. We are sorry that they have not taken that opportunity. For the reasons that I have mentioned, not least the lack of evidence to show that raising the age bar will have any effect on violent crime, we do not believe that the age limit should be 18 for air weapons, and we certainly see no reason why rifle and shotgun owners should be prejudiced. More to the point, in tabling the amendment, the Liberal Democrats seem not to have discussed the issue with people who shoot.
New clauses 17 and 18 taken together with clause 26 would have a serious and unjustifiable adverse effect on legitimate users of airguns and people who sell them. The new clauses were tabled with very little notice—about a week—and there has been insufficient opportunity for us to consult on them with the people who would specifically be affected.
New clause 17 would prohibit any person other than a registered dealer from selling or transferring air weapons. Can the Minister provide any evidence that airguns are being misused because they are being obtained through trade sources instead of private sale?
My views on these excessive proposals for restrictions on air weapons will be made in clear on clause stand part. What I find most staggering is that the Home Office consultation paper of May 2004 stated:
“We do not therefore believe that there should be a system of licensing or further restrictions on the sale of air guns”.
Why are the Government ignoring their own advice? Banning the sale of air weapons except through registered firearms dealers approved by the police is an impracticable, draconian, burdensome and disproportionate measure that will have little impact on violent crime and will serve only to penalise business people and sportsmen and women involved in shooting.
There are an estimated 7 million air weapons in circulation in the United Kingdom. Are the Government proposing that those 7 million air weapons should be registered? If not, how will the provision work in practice? If they do not propose to register those 7 million air weapons, that surely shows the futility and disproportionate nature of the amendment. Presumably, the financial losses and  associated expenses for businesses will be significant. Can the Government provide a figure? Have they looked into the matter? Currently, less than 50 per cent. of airguns are sold by firearms dealers. The majority are sold by sports shops and similar outlets. Why are the Government going to all that trouble and creating so much red tape when, bizarrely, the damage that someone with criminal intent could cause with the proverbial cricket bat could be far worse than that of an air weapon?
I am afraid that scapegoat-ism must be mentioned. In its regulatory impact assessment, the Home Office recognises that licensing all air weapons would result in a significant decrease in sales of air weapons and would have a significant impact on business. It says:
“We understand that the majority of air weapons are sold through small dealers and tackle shops, so small firms would be affected disproportionately.”
How many small sellers does the Minister believe will actually convert to obtaining a firearms licence? The cost and inconvenience will probably be disproportionate, and business as well as sport could suffer. How difficult will it be to obtain a licence? The requirement to be registered as an arms dealer will place a heavy bureaucratic burden on a person who sells airguns as part of a wider sports business and could make it uncommercial for most of them to continue to do so.
Although the requirement would make it more difficult for lawful users to acquire air weapons, there is no evidence that it would affect the level of misuse. Registration requirements would also increase the administrative burden on the police. We do not intend to vote against the new clause at this stage, but we believe that it is too prohibitive. To become a registered firearms dealer will take time and incur expense, and it will be impractical for the many dealers who legally sell air weapons at the moment. Moreover, will the cost of registration be borne by shooters on top of their game licence fees, their shotgun licences if they also have shotguns or rifles, or their firearms certificates?
Rather than requiring full registration, why is not it more appropriate to require those who want to sell airguns simply to apply to the police in writing for the authority to do so? The police could refuse to give their authority if they believed that the applicant was not a fit person to sell airguns, and the applicant could be given a right of appeal. The requirement to maintain full records of airguns in a firearms register is simply unnecessary. It might prove more acceptable if the Government proposed a modified arrangement or a modified, more open licence for airguns—for instance, one that could be purchased at little cost—or regulation by camping and fishing shops. We therefore reserve our right to vote against the new clause on Report once we have had time to understand the Government’s thinking. We ask the Government to say why the new clause is required and to give details of how it will look in practice and the costs involved for retailers and sportsmen.
On new clause 18, again, where is the evidence to support the measure? We appreciate that the intention is to outlaw all sales via the internet or mail order, but how exactly will the new clause do that? The measure applies where a person sells to an individual in Great Britain who is not a registered firearms dealer. The main cause of concern about internet sales arises not from such sales from within the United Kingdom but from sales originating from outside the UK. Will the Minister please tell us how the new clause will criminalise foreign sellers overseas? Only exceptionally, and then only if required by clear words, will an Act of Parliament extend to foreigners overseas.

Stephen McCabe: What evidence has the hon. Gentleman to support the contention that internet sales within the UK are not a major source of concern? Has he had the opportunity to follow the Nottingham trial for the guns–to-thugs case, which was quite widely reported?

Jonathan Djanogly: I must reverse the hon. Gentleman’s contention. The point is that the Government tabled the amendments about a week ago, but we have seen no evidence or statistics to support them. I am asking the Government to provide that evidence, and I am saying that we will not vote against the amendments now but will want to assess their impact. Those are valid points.
The small number of existing crimes that extend to foreigners overseas are all very serious crimes that are international in character, such as terrorism and hijacking, or which contravene international law, such as piracy and breaching the Geneva conventions on the treatment of prisoners of war. The offences in the new clause are not of a similar nature, and it would be inappropriate to extend them to include acts committed by foreigners overseas.
The National Small-bore Rifle Association represents more than 1,100 affiliated clubs across the UK. It has more than 100,000 direct members, including scouts, school-goers and cadets. Some members live in Inverness, others in Sussex. By enacting the clause, the 100,000 members who do not hold a firearms certificate—I imagine that is the majority—will not be able to trade their air weapons with each other by airmail. That is needless bureaucracy and red tape, and it represents an attack on their legitimate sport. I believe that mail order sales of air guns form a large percentage of the trade, and the prohibition of such sales is not proportionate and would not prevent the misuse of airguns.

John Thurso: I tabled amendment No. 152 so that I could ask the Minister some simple questions. Why 17? Why not 18? When are the Government going to look at all the ages and make the law consistent? That is the only purpose of the amendment.
I have some sympathy with amendment No. 192, because air weapons have a wide range of power. They range from those used at fairs which can barely get a cork out of the barrel—the cork limps for 5 ft before  collapsing—to some very powerful weapons. Many criminals use weapons that have a muzzle velocity close to that for expanding ammunition, which is why my slightly tongue-in-cheek question about joules is extremely important. As in all our discussions, we need to ensure that we are hitting those who need to be hit.
The hon. Gentleman lost me when he said that it was all right—this is a slight paraphrase—for kids to go popping off airguns at windows.

Jonathan Djanogly: I did not say it was all right. I said the opposite. If people break windows they should pay for it.

John Thurso: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. This goes back to our debate about glorifying guns. To use guns for jolly jape purposes—that was the implication—is entirely wrong, so I do not follow him along that line of argument. However, I wholly support him in saying that we must get it right.
Like the hon. Gentleman, I would like to know more about the Government’s new clauses. I am not sure that I exactly agree with him, but I have probably said enough to indicate that I am firmly in the shooting camp. I am not convinced that any weapon of any kind should be available by mail order or over the internet. I myself have accepted such restrictions. I cannot send my shotgun or firearm by Securicor to the gunsmith to be mended as I used to; I have to take it myself. I accept that; it is part of my responsibility.
I want to know more from the Government. It is quite right that the hon. Gentleman should not press the amendment to a Division. I am more persuaded by tighter controls than I am by looser controls. However, I would like them to be in proportion. That is why, on amendment No. 102, on joules or psi muzzle velocity, he has a definite point.

Hazel Blears: First, as the hon. Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross is not a metric person, I am told that 1 J is 0.8 foot-pounds. I hope that that helps. In preparing for the Bill, I have found out more about joules and muzzle energy than I ever thought possible. However, I do not profess to know as much as the hon. Member for Huntingdon.
I thought that clause 26 was relatively straightforward, but the Committee has expressed concern about it. It increases to 18 the age limit for purchasing or hiring an air weapon. It is aimed at irresponsible young people who get hold of air weapons and do all kinds of mischief with them that cause harm to others. We are dealing with a simple problem here.
Amendment No. 192 would amend the definition of an air weapon in the Firearms Act 1968. I am concerned about that because an air weapon is currently defined as an air rifle, an air gun or an air pistol that is lethal—“lethal” is generally regarded to mean something with a muzzle energy of 1 J or more. Anything between 1 J and 8.13 J is an air pistol, and up to 16.27 J is an air rifle. For anything above that joule level, one requires a firearms certificate, and anything of less than 1 J is not regarded as lethal, and is therefore not a firearm but an imitation.

Jonathan Djanogly: I hear those statistics, but it is worth pointing out that airsoft practitioners, people who shoot each other with pellet guns, use pellet guns with a velocity of about 1 J. Perhaps 1 J would be lethal if one shot somebody in the eye, but thousands of people shoot each other weekly at that velocity.

Hazel Blears: My information is that where there is muzzle energy of 1 J or above, that is lethal as defined in firearms legislation. I am concerned that amendment No. 192 would redefine air weapons as those with a muzzle energy in excess of 4 J. The effect of that appears to be that the age limit would be unchanged for air weapons with a muzzle energy of between 1 J and 4 J. People would still be able to get such weapons at the age of 17. Those are lethal weapons that can be misused by young people, bringing misery to our communities, and it is important that the increased age limit be applied to such weapons. Those of 1 J to 4 J are defined as lethal. I shall shortly come on to the ways in which guns have been used.
The amendment could have the unintended consequence that air weapons of between 1 J and 4 J would have to be held on firearms certificates, because anything of more than 1 J, if it is not an air weapon, has to have such a certificate. I am sure that the shooting community would not want that kind of consequence to flow from the amendment. I would ask the hon. Gentleman to consider withdrawing the amendment on the basis that the regulatory position would be tighter than it is now.
Amendment No. 152 would increase the minimum age for purchasing or hiring a certificated firearm or ammunition in line with the increased age limit for air weapons. That is a different issue. There is not the same problem with young people misusing certificated firearms, because they have to go through a fairly complex certification process with the local police, which involves being assessed as to whether they are fit and proper people. If the police are not satisfied that a young person is fit to be entrusted with a firearm, has a good reason for wanting one and would not be a danger to public safety, no certificate will be issued.
That illustrates that the Government, rather than seeking a blanket ban on shooting, are trying to address the mischief of irresponsible young people who use air weapons to cause misery and distress, particularly in communities where they might fire at properties, causing elderly people to live in fear that an air weapon is going to be used against them. My hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, East mentioned the tragic events that happened in Scotland, and I shall come to them.
I recognise that there is an issue about the age limits in firearms law. My officials have prepared a matrix for me, showing the different age limits and guns. I agree that it is confusing. We have held a consultation process and received some 4,000 responses, and we shall complete the review. However, it would not be appropriate here to go into the detail of harmonising firearms law; this Bill is about reducing violent crime  and is aimed at specific mischiefs. We shall, however, try to ensure that there is more logic in age limits for firearms in general.

Lynne Featherstone: Would the Minister supply us with a copy of her matrix? It would be incredibly useful.

Hazel Blears: I am happy to do that. I am sure that those of us who do not have the experience of the hon. Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross are all on a learning curve.
Amendments Nos. 215 and 216 would apply the age limit for air weapons only to those that are also a realistic imitation firearm or a firearm for which a certificate is required. I know that the hon. Gentleman is concerned about airsoft weapons; we will debate the subject when we come to the definitions of realistic imitation weapons. We have all received a huge amount of correspondence from the airsoft fraternity. That is one reason why I engaged in extensive consultation during the summer with various stakeholders, and with re-enactors, another interested group.
The amendments would not apply the increased age limit of 18 to the vast number of normal airguns between the two extremes, which would go against the purpose of clause 26. Air weapon misuse is carried out using normally powered air weapons, which are commonly available. I ask the hon. Gentleman not to press the amendments.
Government amendment No. 292 and new clauses 17 and 18 deal with the fact that the misuse of air weapons is now a serious problem. In 2003-04, air weapons were used in 13,756 crimes, and not all of them were cases of nuisance, or low-level criminal damage. That figure included 2,395 offences in which air weapons caused injury, including 156 cases of serious injury. We are not talking about people firing air weapons just at property; we are talking about serious injury. All those incidents caused pain and fear to the victims and their families. Occasionally we hear of a particularly tragic incident: earlier this year, a two-year-old boy was shot dead in Glasgow by a man using an air weapon. It is vital to do all that we can to tackle the problem.
We strengthened existing controls in the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003. We increased the age limit from 14 to 17, and we made it an arrestable offence to have an air weapon in public, whether loaded or not, without reasonable excuse. The clause further strengthens our position.
Following the Andrew Morton shooting, I have been in close contact with Scottish Ministers to see whether we can take further steps to tighten the availability of air weapons. The Government amendments require anyone who sells air weapons by way of trade of business to register with the police as a firearms dealer. I understand that that will cost about £150 per establishment. I genuinely think that that is a reasonable fee, as it gives us a degree of oversight of the sale of air weapons. I do not accept that the fee is  extortionate, or that it will be a burden that most businesses will be unable to meet. It is a small price to pay for the increased ability to see exactly who is selling air weapons, and to whom.

Jonathan Djanogly: I would be grateful, as might other hon. Members, if the Minister sent a note on how the licensing regime is likely to work.

Hazel Blears: I undertake to provide further information to hon. Members about what is envisaged.
The provision will make retailers accountable to the police, who will be able to withdraw registration if a retailer becomes a danger to public safety—for example, if he starts to sell to under-age persons. Records of transactions will have to be kept. That will remove the anonymity of purchasers, which should help deter casual and irresponsible sales. It will be a requirement for all air weapons to be handed over face to face. It will also allow a check on the proof of age, thereby tackling the risk of under-age purchasers through the internet or mail order.

Stewart Hosie: I appreciate what the Minister said about tightening up the sale of air weapons, identifying sales to under-age people and so on, but she will surely concede that by licensing the vendors rather than the individual, those who seem perfectly normal will still be able to buy weapons from a licensed shop. A licensing scheme for the purchaser—the individual—would be far more rigorous than one in which only the vendor was licensed.

Hazel Blears: I understand that point. When drafting the Bill, we tried to make its provisions proportionate to the mischief that we aim to deal with. The vast majority of people with air weapons are responsible owners. We are trying to ensure that we do whatever we can to limit the opportunity of people, particularly young people, to buy air weapons at car boot sales or through mail order.
As for the hon. Gentleman’s suggestion, I am afraid that the number of air weapons in the country would make the licensing scheme a fairly significant bureaucratic undertaking, although in an ideal world, it might have some benefits. We are trying to be proportionate. We are looking at the damage to see if we can put in place something relatively simple and straightforward that does not cost people a huge amount, but which gives the public a bit of reassurance that such guns are not simply being sold to under-age youngster in corner shops. We are often accused of being fairly extreme, but on this occasion we are trying to be proportionate. About 200,000 new air weapons are sold every year, and most are used responsibly, but some fall into the hands of an irresponsible minority and are misused.
The final issue raised by the hon. Member for Huntingdon was sales on the internet, and they have been a significant problem. Last year, the police carried out a major operation—Operation Bembridge—in which they mounted one of the largest  ever co-ordinated raids. They targeted people who had bought weapons over the internet that were prohibited in the UK, although those were not necessarily air weapons, and there were a whole range of other weapons. The police confiscated a huge amount of weaponry, so the internet has clearly been a problem.
I entirely acknowledge that seeking to enforce the law over foreign internet providers is difficult. We had exactly the same problems with child pornography, but our relationships with other countries—our sharing of intelligence and information—are much improved. We must do as much as we can to secure international co-operation to deal with the way in which such internet sites are hosted. As a result of concerns raised last year, I recently had a meeting with eBay and I was reassured by the people who host it that they have some good methods of ensuring that such products do not find their way on to their site. I hope that increasingly, all internet providers will ensure that they comply with the law, and that people cannot obtain air weapons from them. I therefore ask hon. Members not to press their amendments.

Jonathan Djanogly: The Minister’s response on internet sites raised more questions than answers, particularly about the acquisition of foreign sites and the sorts of  weapons that are being purchased. I think she said that it was other weapons, not air weapons, that were the problem, and had been the subject of the raids.
 We have problems with the clause as regards velocity, and that will come out as we move towards the clause stand part debate. If the clause is to stand, however, its approach should be less broad brush. The Minister said that it was not a broad-brush approach, but the fact is that there will be a blanket ban for 17-year-olds. We still do not see how the Minister can maintain that a 17-year-old is likely to be more violent with an air rifle than an 18-year-old. Indeed, we do not feel that she has given any reasons for the clause at all. I am afraid, therefore, that the matter remains open—but for the moment, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Further consideration adjourned.—[Kevin Brennan.]

Adjourned accordingly at twenty-seven minutes to Five o’clock till Tuesday 25 October at half-past Ten o’clock.